Impact of quarter hourly imbalance settlement period on the Nordic physical electricity market by Solovian, Andrej
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrej Solovian 
 
Impact of quarter hourly imbalance settlement period on the 
Nordic physical electricity market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the de-
gree of Master of Science in Technology 
 
Espoo, June 27th, 2019 
Supervisor: Professor Sanna Syri 
Advisor: Timo Suhonen, FM
 Aalto-yliopisto, PL 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Diplomityön tiivistelmä 
 
 
Tekijä Andrej Solovian 
Työn nimi Viidentoista minuutin taseselvitysjakson vaikutus Pohjoismaisiin sähkö-
markkinoihin ja kaupankäyntimenetelmiin 
Koulutusohjelma Sustainable Energy Systems and Mar-
kets 
Koodi ELEC3048 
Työn valvoja Professori Sanna Syri 
Työn ohjaaja(t) Timo Suhonen, FM 
Päivämäärä 27.6.2019 Sivumäärä 53 Kieli Englanti 
Tiivistelmä 
   Pohjoismaisen synkronialueen taajuushallinta on yhä haastavampaa enenevien tasavir-
tayhteyksien sekä uusiutuvan sähkön tuotannon johdosta. Tässä diplomityössä käsitel-
lään sähkömarkkinoiden sääntelyä, jonka tarkoituksena on helpottaa taajuushallintaa ja 
tehdä siitä markkinaehtoisempaa. Työn kannalta ratkaisevia sääntelyjä lähitulevaisuu-
dessa ovat: velvoite muodostaa hinta päivänsisäisen markkinan kapasiteetille, siirtymi-
nen yksitasemalliin, tasesähkön hinnanmuodostuksen tiukentuminen, päivänsisäisen 
kaupankäynnin sulkeminen taseselvitysyksikköön nähden sekä siirtyminen viidentoista 
minuutin taseselvitysjaksoon eli varttitaseeseen. Työn tarkoitus on eritoten arvioida vart-
titaseen vaikutuksia pohjoismaiseen sähkömarkkinaan, sillä tämä on sääntelyistä vaiku-
tusvaltaisin. 
   Jotta tarkemman taseselvitysjakson vaikutuksia pystyisi kvantitatiivisesti arvioimaan, 
tutkin työssäni Saksan päivänsisäistä huutokauppaa, joka käydään viidentoista minuutin 
tarkkuudella. Analyysissä käytettävä data on peräisin vuodelta 2018. Kvantitatiivisen 
analyysin tarkoitus oli löytää järjestelmällistä käyttäytymistä sähkömarkkinaosapuolilta 
viidentoista minuutin tuotteilla. Analyysin menetelmä oli kerätä kuukausikeskihinnat jo-
kaiselle päivän varttitunnille ja verrata niitä vuorokausimarkkinoiden tuntihintaan. Ana-
lyysin tulokset osoittivat, että päivänsisäiset hinnat ovat vahvasti syklisiä ja määräytyvät 
vuorokausimarkkinan tuntihintoihin pohjautuen. Päivänsisäisten varttihintojen volatili-
teetin perusteella voidaan todentaa, että markkinaosapuolet käyvät pääsääntöisesti kaup-
paa oletetun tuotannon tai kulutuksen erotuksesta vuorokausimarkkinoilla jo allokoituun 
tukkusähköön nähden. Näin ollen viidentoista minuutin taseselvitysjakso on toiminut 
voimakkaana kannustimena välttää tasesähkön ostamista varttitunneilla, vaan ostaa se 
päivänsisäisiltä markkinoilta. Tulosten perusteella samaa varttitaseen vaikutusta odote-
taan Pohjoismaisiin sähkömarkkinoihin, missä tämä vahvasti kannustaisi markkinaosa-
puolia käymään kauppaa myös varttitunnin tuotteilla. 
   Kirjallisuuskatsaukseen pohjautuen on näyttöä, että Saksan tukkusähkömarkkinoilla 
kaupankäynti varttitunnin tuotteilla sekä lähempänä toimitushetkeä ovat vähentäneet 
kantaverkon tasapainottamisen tarvetta. Yksi työn johtopäätöksistä on, että sähkömark-
kinamalli vaikuttaa laajalti synkronialueen taajuudenhallintaan. Kuitenkin koska Poh-
joismaat ovat jakautuneet yhteentoista tarjousalueeseen, samoja hyötyjä kuin Saksassa ei 
voida odottaa Pohjoismaissa ilman laajamittaisia muutoksia annettavien sähkönsiirtoka-
pasiteettien resoluutioon. Ihannetilanteessa sähkönsiirto tarjousalueiden välillä määräy-
tyisi varttitunnin tarkkuudella, jatkuvalla ramping-reunaehdolla. Lisäksi tasavirtakaape-
leita olisi mahdollista käyttää tarjousalueiden välisien taajuuspoikkeamien netottami-
seen. Kuitenkin optimaalisesta tarjousalueiden välisestä sähkönsiirtoyhteyksien käytöstä 
viidentoista minuutin taseselvitysjakson aikana on tehtävä lisätutkimusta.  
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Abstract 
   Increasingly interconnected Nordic synchronous area coupled with increasing amount 
of intermittent generations poses a challenge to power system balancing. This thesis ex-
amines a set of regulatory measures which are to be implied for Nordic electricity markets 
to ease the balancing of the grid and possibly make it increasingly market based. The reg-
ulatory changes identified in the thesis are introduction of intraday cross-zonal capacity 
pricing methodology, introduction of one balance model, tightening of imbalance settle-
ment pricing, introduction to rolling gate closure with relation to market time unit and 
most importantly introduction of 15-minute imbalance settlement period. As 15-minute 
imbalance settlement period is considered the most fundamental change, the purpose of 
thesis is to assess the impact of it to Nordic electricity market. 
   In order to quantitatively assess the impact of quarter hourly imbalance settlement pe-
riod to Nordic electricity markets a German quarter hourly intraday auction was studied. 
The auction data used in the thesis is from year 2018. The purpose of analysis was to find 
systematic behaviour from market participants in quarter hourly trading. The method was 
to compile average prices of quarters over a month and compare them with day-ahead 
prices. It was found out that intraday auction prices possessed cyclical “zig-zag” pattern 
which revolved around day-ahead prices. After studying volatility of intraday auction 
prices, it led to conclusion that market participants were trading error of expected pro-
duction and already allocated volume in day-ahead market. Based on the observation 
market participants were actively trying to avoid imbalance settlement by fixing their po-
sition in intraday market. The same impact of quarter hourly resolution is expected to the 
Nordic electricity market, which would push market participants to actively trade in the 
intra-hourly imbalances.  
   Based on literature review, it was found out that in German markets trading in finer 
resolution and closer to time of delivery has decreased the need for balancing of the power 
system. One of the key findings of the thesis was that power market design is strongly 
linked with balancing need of power system. It was identified that since Nordic electricity 
market is divided into eleven price areas, the same effect cannot be achieved from 15-
minute trading as in German case without involvement of interconnectors. According to 
thesis ideally interconnector flow would be determined on 15-minute resolution, inter-
connector ramping would be continuous and HVDC interconnectors could be used for 
imbalance netting with central European markets. However, more research needs to be 
conducted on the topic on how interconnectors would be utilized in most efficient manner 
with respect to all stakeholders.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The Nordic electricity market has historically been considered as well functioning elec-
tricity market. Having a complex topology of total of 11 delivery areas only in Nordics, 
three delivery areas in Baltics all interconnected, the market has allocated efficient flows 
over the borders and subjected electricity to socially optimal pricing.  
 
The Nordic synchronous area is relatively small sized, compared to other synchronous 
grids in Europe. Compared to its size, it is heavily interconnected to other synchronous 
areas such as regional grid central Europe and regional grid Baltic. Due to availability of 
on average cheaper electricity, Nordics synchronous grid keeps becoming increasingly 
interconnected with rest of the Europe. Simultaneous increase in intermittent renewable 
energy generation in Nordics (mainly wind power but also solar generation) has subjected 
Nordic synchronous grid to systematic imbalances between demand and supply. As there 
has been no tool to address these imbalances, over the course of the years, frequency 
quality of Nordic synchronous area has constantly decreased, and the downward trend 
continues (ENTSO-E, 2019, sec. Frequency stability). 
 
The European regulation has intervened, by obliging Nordic countries to imply some 
structural changes to electricity market such as transition to 15-minute imbalance settle-
ment period and introduction to pan-European cross-zonal intraday auctions, further in-
creasing European electricity market integration (EUR-Lex, 2017) (ACER, 2018a). Sim-
ultaneously in the Nordics, there has been proposed other changes to regulation around 
electricity markets, such as moving from two-balance settlement model to one-balance 
settlement model, changes to ramping, and changes to power system balancing (Statnett 
and Svenska Kraftnät, 2017). The underlying reason for this has been, that optimal elec-
tricity market outcome has deviated from optimal power system outcome. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate market impact of these regulatory changes, espe-
cially the impact of finer imbalance settlement period. There are already countries in Eu-
rope that have implemented 15-minute imbalance settlement period. Some of these coun-
tries have different market designs as Nordics, for example with availability of intraday 
auctions and shorter products. Previous research has shown that imbalance settlement 
period, thus the market time unit, has large impact on market structure and behaviour of 
market participants (Kiesel and Paraschiv, 2017) (Neuhoff et al., 2016). To fully under-
stand impact of 15-minute imbalance settlement period in Nordics, the German intraday 
market prices are analysed against day-ahead prices in the thesis. This is believed to give 
insight how finer market resolution affects market behaviour of market participants. 
Therefore, the research questions of the thesis are as follows: 
• First research question addresses behaviour of market participants, specifically 
how 15-minute imbalance settlement period will affect trading behaviour of mar-
ket participants in the Nordics?  
• Second research question addresses the declining frequency of Nordic synchro-
nous grid, specifically what are the possible impacts of 15-minute imbalance set-
tlement period to Nordic synchronous grid?  
• Third research question is whether there are any other benefits from 15-minute 
imbalance settlement period specifically for Nordics in context of market cou-
pling, system balancing or short proximity markets. 
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2 Electricity market model in the Nordics 
European commission regulation (EU) 2015/1222, the guideline on capacity allocation 
and congestion management hereby referred as CACM urges Transmission System Op-
erators (TSOs) and Nominated Electricity Market Operators (NEMOs) for close collabo-
ration in order to further harmonize European electricity markets. One of the key purposes 
of the regulation, is to set the framework of co-operation for NEMOs, TSOs and regula-
tory authorities to establish single day-ahead coupling (SDAC) and single intraday cou-
pling (SIDC). CACM urges electricity markets to operate to maximize social benefit from 
electricity trade.    
 
2.1 Day-Ahead Coupling 
The way of integrating different electricity markets via implicit auction system is called 
market coupling. The main benefits of market are shared order books of different power 
exchanges (PXs) or geographical areas thus improving the liquidity of the market, also 
optimizing cross-zonal flows. In other words, in coupled markets the supply and demand 
orders are not confined to local territorial area. This allows market clearing based on ag-
gregated supply and demand with cheapest merit order, only being restricted by con-
straints of transmission network. When two separate markets with price difference and 
cross-border interconnection are coupled via implicit auction, the prices of these two mar-
kets will converge. If there is enough interconnector capacity between markets the prices 
will fully converge. However, if the interconnector capacity is insufficient, the bottleneck 
will be formed, and markets will remain separate price areas. Nevertheless, even in case 
of the bottleneck, the prices will converge with respect to the cross-border flow. One 
market will experience price increase, therefore gain in producer surplus and loss in con-
sumer surplus. Respectively the other will experience price decrease, therefore gain in 
consumer surplus and loss in producer surplus. However, when these two markets are 
considered as one, social welfare of the market is maximized. The purpose of market 
coupling is to maximize social welfare. (Gómez, 2016)  
 
The price coupling of regions (PRC) is initiative of eight European power exchanges. The 
purpose of the project is to develop a single price coupling solution to calculate day-ahead 
electricity prices and flows across Europe. One of key achievements of the PCR project 
is the development of a single price-coupling algorithm EUPHEMIA. The EUPHEMIA 
has been developed to perform the market coupling of the day-ahead markets in the PCR 
region, essentially the most of Europe. Although each PX collects the orders of market 
participants separately, those are submitted simultaneously to EUPHEMIA shortly after 
day-ahead gate closure at 12.00 CET. The EUPHEMIA matches the orders in concord-
ance with prices to be published such that: 
 
1. The social welfare, i.e. consumer surplus + producer surplus + congestion rent across 
the regions generated by the executed orders is maximal. 
2. The power flows induced by the executed orders, resulting in the net positions do not 
exceed the capacity of the relevant network elements.  
 
Hence, the Day-Ahead auction is cleared once a day by PXs’ developed algorithm EU-
PHEMIA to allocate uniform pricing, positions of market participants and cross border 
flows for the next day. The clearing is set to optimize social welfare with respect to avail-
able cross border capacity and other grid constraints, such as ramping.   
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The pan-European day-ahead coupling has been a success. Apart from transparent prices 
and increased market liquidity, a notable accomplishment has been increased economic 
efficiency of interconnectors. In 2010 only 60.7% of interconnector flow was in right 
economic direction (price difference >1 €/MWh), whereas by 2017 it was 86% (C. ACER, 
2018, chap. 5). Essentially these figures tell, that electricity is systematically flowing from 
low price areas to high price areas. As a result, over the past 8 years thanks to Day-Ahead 
market coupling, EU consumers have gained significant welfare benefits.  
 
2.2 Intraday coupling  
To comply with the requirement of CACM article 51, the implementation of single intra-
day coupling, European PXs and TSOs have jointly developed a pan-European IT-plat-
form for continuous intraday trading, the XBID platform. The XBID platform facilitates 
continuous matching of market participants’ buy and sell orders in the shared order book 
by utilizing cross-border capacity where available. The order book is shared among all 
regions participating in the market, ranging from Portugal to Finland. The TSOs provide 
cross-border capacity to capacity management module, which calculates available trans-
mission capacity as trading occurs. (ENTSO-E, 2018a) 
 
In the XBID, the different markets are coupled via implicit continuous capacity allocation 
method. This means that order book of market area A is visible to market area B’s order 
book only if there is capacity between these two market areas. After each trade across 
market areas, the transmission capacity available for intraday trades is updated, it de-
creases in direction of the transaction and increases for trades in opposite direction. If 
required transmission capacity to execute a transaction is no longer available, the order 
books between area A and B are no longer shared. As a result, market participants of both 
market areas A and B can trade only locally. (Alexander von Selasinsky, 2014) 
 
It is important to note, that continuous intraday solution fundamentally differs from auc-
tion mechanism, as the market is not cleared by third entity such as PX, rather market 
participants clear the market themselves. Term continuous refers to market being con-
stantly open for buy and sell orders. The trades occur when matching criterion are met, 
which generally are quantity and limit price. Limit price is either the indicated maximum 
willingness to pay for quantity of electricity specified (bid) or the minimum willingness 
to sell volume electricity specified (ask). Eventually continuous intraday market partici-
pants develop an order depth for each product available. Order depth means that both buy 
and sell orders, which do not satisfy matching criterion, are sorted by highest limit bid 
price and lowest limit ask price. The highest indicated willingness of buyer to pay for 
electricity is therefore not sufficient to engage the lowest willingness of seller in transac-
tion for current product. If two orders with identical price are placed, the order that was 
placed first will be matched first to an order that either exceeds or is exact to limit price. 
(Alexander von Selasinsky, 2014) 
 
As continuous trading implies that trades can be settled whenever a market participant 
accepts an offer of another market participant, it can be said, that intraday market is a race 
of speed, as trading occurs on first-come-first-serve principle. On one hand this can be 
recognized as advantage, since it allows market participants to trade whenever they can 
expect benefits from trading up to the gate closure of a product. In other words, all possi-
ble market information, such as wind forecast or electricity demand, can be utilized real 
time and allowing market participants to fix their position accordingly. Article by Richard 
Schraff argues that intraday trading can facilitate the integration of vRES, as production 
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forecasts closer to delivery hour are more precise than day before in day ahead market 
(Scharff and Amelin, 2016). Overall, an efficient ID electricity market requires sufficient 
market liquidity, because it enable market participant’s access to a larger portfolio of bids 
and offers to meet their balancing needs. As for the integration of renewable resources, 
intraday liquidity is crucial for optimal integration. Without sufficient liquidity there will 
be no counterparty for renewable generation holders to fix their position with, thus leav-
ing them out of balance. (C. ACER, 2018, chap. 4.2)  
 
On the other hand, the great disadvantage of continuous trading is a lower allocative ef-
ficiency due to it’s first-come-first-serve nature. The price of matched trades depends on 
prices of submitted orders; after a trade is matched another trade can only be matched 
from orders remaining or new orders. There is thus no uniform pricing for market areas, 
which means, that some trades on  with positive welfare contribution might not to be 
realized while trades with negative welfare contribution might be realized (Scharff and 
Amelin, 2016). Essentially, there is no systematic approach to market clearing in intraday; 
hence, there is no guarantee of welfare maximization to occur.  
 
From the system point of view, another disadvantage of continuous intraday market is 
that it has no mechanism embedded to reflect cross-zonal capacity pricing. In essence, 
XBID platform is made to trade volumes and sets intraday capacity price to zero. This 
leads to a problem that continuous intraday market does not reveal the value of cross 
zonal capacity when it’s scarce. Here is an illustration. Capacity between two adjacent 
market areas A and B has been used by trading three hours before delivery, since area A 
has cheaper electricity than area B. One hour prior to delivery electricity has become 
scarce in area B, and some market participants would want to pay more for cheaper elec-
tricity from area A. In such situation, due to nature of implicit allocation, the market par-
ticipants value also capacity more than two hours prior. Thus, they are also willing to pay 
more for it than two hours prior. Their willingness to pay more, however, is not reflected 
to the market as capacity is depleted and there is no mechanism to set price for it. There-
fore, continuous intraday market is not incompliant with CACM Recital 22, which states: 
“Reliable pricing of transmission capacity should be introduced for the intraday market 
time-frame, reflecting congestion if capacity is scarce”(EUR-Lex, 2015). (ENTSO-E, 
2017a) 
 
An alternative market for continuous intraday market is intraday auction. Essentially, in-
traday auction has the same mechanism of market clearing as day ahead auction. The 
difference between intraday auction to day-ahead auction is that it occurs closer to the 
delivery just as name suggests. On the contrary to single intraday coupling, there has not 
been implemented any pan-European market model with intraday auctions, rather there 
are country specific market models involving intraday auctions. Such countries are for 
instance, Germany, Spain and Portugal, and Italy. The intraday auctions have different 
country specific products and different gate opening and closing times. Interestingly, in 
countries where intraday volumes account for most percentage of the demand such as 
Spain, Portugal, Italy and Germany intraday auctions are present in the market design and 
therefore facilitate organized ID market. Another common characteristic for these coun-
tries is high penetration of renewables. Intraday auctions are not necessarily a causation 
for increased intraday trading, but some market participants might value them, as they 
facilitate organized clearing at certain times.  
 
According to study on trading behaviour by (Scharff and Amelin, 2016), that most of the 
continuous intraday trading is done manually and that not all market participants monitor 
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the market around the clock. Although the data in the study is from year 2013, after which 
trading has increasingly automatized (Koch and Hirth, 2018), the continuous intraday 
trading nevertheless requires commitment to market monitoring. In case of intraday auc-
tions, market participants only need to access the market at discrete timings of auctions. 
Even though intraday auctions can set value for capacity, most of the intraday auctions 
are inter zonal, with no access to cross zonal capacities as day-ahead auctions have, on 
the contrary. The exception here is Spanish and Portuguese border, but those are operated 
under the same monopoly power exchange. Intraday liquidity in general is mostly intra-
zonal both in auctions and continuous trading. The share of intra-zonal trades in auctions 
is 77% and in continuous intraday 78% across the Europe (C. ACER, 2018, fig. 25). 
Therefore, even though intraday auctions value cross-zonal capacities, for the most part 
they are not used in cross border trading as of today.  
 
2.3 Role of Transmission System Operator 
Transmission system operators (TSOs) operate the transmission grid of respective coun-
try or area. In other words, they facilitate the infrastructure for the power market. Large 
industrial customers, both producers and consumers as well as distribution grids con-
nected to transmission system.  
 
TSOs have many responsibilities, on one hand they are responsible for developing the 
grid and on the other operating it. Operating the grid is most importantly keeping the 
balance between production and consumption, i.e. maintaining the 50 Hz frequency. This 
is not so straight forward, however. Even though the transmission grids are national, the 
neighbouring transmission grids form synchronous areas. Essentially this means that fre-
quency in the gird does not follow the national borders, rather the boundaries of synchro-
nous area. Nordics form a synchronous area, part of which being Finland, Sweden, Nor-
way and Denmark for the DK2 price zone. This setup longs for collaboration between 
Nordic TSOs and standardization of balancing methods and products. Frequently the col-
laboration between TSOs is driver for changes within synchronous area. Figure 1 below 
depicts Nordic synchronous area, and neighbouring synchronous areas as well as inter-
connectors connecting these.  
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Figure 1: High Voltage Direct Current interconnectors from Nordic synchronous area (ENTSO-E, 
2017b) 
 
Another task of TSO is developing the grid. The TSOs can develop the grid within the 
market area but also cross-border. Local development essentially is improving the grid 
within the market area. Some of these improvements could be for instance to transfer 
power in larger quantities between delivery areas or within delivery areas, with less losses 
avoiding loop flows and internal bottlenecks.  
The cross zonal development essentially means increasing interconnector capacity be-
tween market areas. If there occurs a situation, when adjacent market areas are not fully 
coupled due to lack of capacity on interconnectors, the market areas will create two sep-
arate price zones with price difference. This is known as bottleneck. TSOs collect con-
gestion revenue over bottlenecks, according to following equation: 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
(
€
ℎ
) =
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑜𝑛
𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑎ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
 (𝑀𝑊) ∗
𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
(
€
𝑀𝑊ℎ
)  (1) 
 
The congestion revenue is distributed evenly between Nordic TSOs, meaning that respec-
tive TSOs split the congestion revenue in half. The regulation urges to spend all collected 
congestion revenue. Mainly the revenue is used for either investing into the interconnect-
ors, thus alleviating the congestion, reduction of grid fees, countertrading or depositing 
for future investments. Underline of regulation being that received congestion rent should 
be invested. (Fingrid Oyj, 2018a)    
 
Distribution system operators (DSOs) operate distribution grids, which deliver electricity 
to small businesses and residential customers. Whereas there is only one transmission 
grid per country and usually only one respective TSO, there are multiple distribution grids 
and DSOs within a country. In Finland for example, there are closer to 80 distribution 
grids, respectively around 80 DSOs. Nevertheless, 15 largest ones account for 70% of 
electricity distribution in terms of energy delivery. DSOs only deliver electricity to their 
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customers, they do not own it, and thus they cannot sell it. The retail companies sell elec-
tricity to customers, whereas DSOs only charge the delivery fee. (Finnish Energy, 2014) 
 
An important role of DSOs in all Nordic countries is consumption metering. Essentially 
all Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark) have some form of regulation 
that obliges the DSOs, sometimes the customer, to meter the consumption of electricity 
hourly. There are country specific exemptions for some sites not to be metered hourly, 
but the baseline is that most of the consumption is metered hourly. The meters are read 
either once a day or once a week depending from country. (NordREG, 2014) The DSOs 
meter the consumption data of the customers and share the information with retailers, 
which further use the information when acting in the electricity market. Market partici-
pants have been extremely satisfied with such arrangement, as all market decisions can 
be based on metered data, which diminishes greatly the uncertainty of estimation (Ener-
giavirasto, 2018). For example, estimating the energy demand of residential customers is 
important factor in buying correct amount of energy from the wholesale market. The me-
tered data aids to choose correct quantity by providing information on consumption be-
haviour.   
 
2.3.1 Balancing markets in Nordics 
TSOs are responsible for balancing electricity production and consumption in the trans-
mission grid. Instead of actively using own generation assets TSOs purchase balancing 
services, sometimes referred to as balancing reserves, either as balancing energy or ca-
pacity. Reserves generally refer to production or consumption assets which can either 
increase or decrease load in the grid in fixed amount of time. There are several markets 
where different kinds of reserves can be acquired. Although, balancing markets are 
mostly national, in Nordics the balancing products are essentially the same, with some 
country specific nuances. Generally, balancing reserves are divided into three categories: 
Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR), Frequency Restoration Reserve (FRR) and Re-
placement Reserve (RR). Replacement reserves are not used in Nordic power system. 
 
FCRs are automatically activated reserves triggered by deviation in frequency from nom-
inal value. There are two types FCRs, Frequency Containment Reserve for Disturbances 
(FCR-D) and Frequency Containment Reserve for Normal Operation (FCR-N). The FCR-
N is continuously used reserve to contain frequency in between 49,9 – 50,1 Hz, whereas 
FCR-D is only activated when frequency falls below 49,9 Hz. Both reserves are activated 
automatically. In Finland, the FCR is attained either from neighbouring countries via in-
terconnectors or from domestic suppliers based on yearly or hourly auctions. The yearly 
auction is held on autumn to acquire reserve capacity for next year and daily auction each 
day at 18.30 for next day on hourly resolution. The results from latter auction are pub-
lished at 22.00 EET. The FCR market is capacity market, meaning that only capacity is 
traded for the reserve, not the energy itself. Upon activation of reserves, the realized en-
ergy expenditure is billed separately. As FCR-D reserves are rarely activated, FRC-N 
reserves are essentially fine-tuning of frequency, where generation sites adjust their 
power output to maintain nominal frequency.  
 
FRR can be divided into two categories, Automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve 
(aFRR) and Manual Frequency Restoration Reserves (mFRR). The aFFR reserves are 
automatically activated when frequency deviation of Nordic synchronous area has 
reached certain threshold. aFFR is used to restore Nordic synchronous frequency to nom-
inal value and release already committed frequency driven reserves. Although Statnett 
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monitors the Nordic synchronous area frequency, the aFFR markets are national. aFRR 
markets are capacity markets, where only capacity is traded, and energy delivery actual-
izes upon activation of reserve.  
 
The mFRR have same purpose as aFRR, only they are activated manually by operator. 
The mFRR comprehends from both balancing energy markets and balancing capacity 
markets.  By balancing capacity markets TSOs secure that they have enough capacity for 
possible up-regulation. The capacity for the balancing capacity market is procured in 
weekly auctions. The capacity that is allocated for the balancing capacity market, shall 
not be sold as any other reserve type or traded in any other market. The balancing energy 
market, commonly referred to as balancing market, is the only market of all reserves 
where energy is traded. Depending by the balancing need of delivery hour, TSO manually 
selects cheapest bids from the merit order, forming balancing market price by the most 
expensive order activated during delivery hour. Unlike any other reserve type, balancing 
market has common liquidity pool in Nordic countries. For this market, market partici-
pants shall place hourly bids for the delivery hour latest 45 minutes before the start of 
delivery hour. The up-regulation and down-regulation bids are placed separately, thus 
price for up-regulation and down-regulation is formed separately. In balancing market, 
the bids are standardized by full activation time (FAT) of 15 minutes. In other words, as 
balancing bid has been manually ordered by TSO, the asset must run on full capacity in 
no longer than 15 minutes.  
 
2.4 Imbalance settlement structure 
The purpose of imbalance settlement is to establish a financial balance of delivery hour 
in electricity market. The imbalance settlement is a financial settlement mechanism for 
charging or paying balance responsible parties (BRPs) for their imbalances. The imbal-
ance settlement is always calculated over fixed unit of time. As the purpose is to finan-
cially settle imbalances of parties within delivery hour, the resolution of imbalance set-
tlement period (ISP) is one hour.  
 
In the Nordics, specifically in Finland, Sweden and Norway, a company named eSett Oy 
is imbalance settlement responsible (ISR). ISR thus eSett Oy is responsible for perform-
ing imbalance settlement and invoicing of Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs) for im-
balances. A BRP is a company that has valid balancing agreement with TSO and valid 
imbalance settlement agreement with eSett. Each BRP has a balance obligation, i.e. an 
obligation to continuously plan and achieve balance between the electricity supplied and 
withdrawn by one or several producers or consumers and perform financial settlement for 
any of imbalances arising from these parties. Every electricity market participant must be 
assigned to a BRP, in order to participate in electricity market. The BRP is responsible 
for submitting hourly plan for specific regulatory object, such as power plant, 45 minutes 
before delivery hour to the TSO. TSO will then forward the binding production plans to 
eSett. If BRP participates in any of balancing or reserves markets host by TSO, TSO will 
report services provided by BRP to TSO. TSO sends the data to eSett, which will be 
further utilized in imbalance settlement.(eSett Oy, 2015) 
 
The Nordic imbalance settlement model is structured by two separate balances for pro-
duction and consumption, which are calculated and settled separately. The production 
imbalance volumes are calculated according to equation (2): 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 −
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
± 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
=
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
   (2) 
 
The consumption imbalance volumes are calculated according to equation (3): 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 −
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
± 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 ±
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
± 
𝑀𝐺𝐴
𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
 =
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
  (3) 
 
The imbalance settlement is for the most part based on the metered data provided by DSO. 
The DSOs are obliged by law to provide measurement data of electricity production and 
consumption needed to fulfil the settlement purposes (Finlex, 2013). Specifically, the 
DSO is responsible for reporting hourly-metered data per production unit to eSett, which 
will then aggregate metered data on BRP level. Same applies for consumption, except 
that consumption metered data is aggregated on retailer level, and further assigned to 
BRP.   
 
Nominated electricity market operator (NEMO) is obliged to report the Day-ahead and 
Intraday trades to its customers and eSett and flows to the eSett and TSOs respectively.  
 
2.4.1 Imbalance fees 
Currently in the Nordics, production and consumption balances are settled separately. 
Imbalances occurring from production are priced according to two-price model, which 
means that positive and negative production imbalances have different prices. During up-
regulation hours, the price of negative production imbalance equals to up-regulation price 
of balancing market, whereas the price of positive production imbalance is the power 
exchange Day-Ahead price. The up-regulation price is always higher than the PX day-
ahead price. In down-regulation hours, the price of negative production imbalance is the 
PX day-ahead price and the price of positive production imbalances is the down-regula-
tion price, which is always lower than the PX day-ahead price. (eSett Oy, 2015) 
 
If both up-ragulation and down-regulation are carried out during the delivery hour, the 
regulation direction of the hour is the direction in which more energy was regulated. In 
hours where no up or down regulation is applied, negative and positive imbalances are 
both priced with the PX market price. (eSett Oy, 2015) 
 
Imbalances in consumption balance are priced according to one price model. This means 
that positive and negative consumption imbalances have the same price. Simply, in up-
regulation hours, the price of both negative and positive consumption imbalance is the 
up-regulation price. Likewise, in down-regulation hours, the price of negative and posi-
tive consumption imbalance is the down regulation price. If there is no regulation during 
the hour, the price of negative and positive consumption imbalance is the PX day-ahead 
price.   
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3 Legislative changes to market in near future  
3.1 Imbalance settlement 
Imbalance settlement structure is a framework for incentivizing BRPs to stay in balance, 
and therefore is a major contributor to a market design. In the near future, imbalance 
settlement structure is subjected to changes both on Nordic and pan-European level.  
 
On November 23rd, 2017 EU commission in co-operation with ACER has released guide-
line on energy balancing (EB GL). The guideline also defines common rules for imbal-
ance settlement. According to article 53 in Electricity Balancing Guideline (EB GL), all 
TSOs shall apply the imbalance settlement period of 15 minutes in all scheduling areas 
by the end of 2020 (EUR-Lex, 2017). From then on, all imbalances will be settled in 
shorter increments.   
 
In the Nordics, the imbalance settlement model will change from two-balance model to 
single-balance model. Instead of calculating separate production and consumption bal-
ances per BRP, there will be only one balance per BRP. The purpose of this change is to 
treat producers and consumers evenly, but also to simplify settlement model for balancing 
providers or intermediary parties such as aggregators. The proposed and probable new 
imbalance calculation model is presented below (Pulkkinen, 2018): 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ± 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 ±
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
±  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
±
𝑀𝐺𝐴
𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
 =
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
         
(4) 
 
The significant impact of single balance model is that no production forecasts need to be 
sent to the TSO 45-minutes before delivery. This in turn enables intraday trading for pro-
ducers up to intraday gate closure, without influencing their balance position. The single 
imbalance settlement model is expected to be in use somewhere between late 2020 to late 
2021. (Fingrid Oyj, 2018b) 
 
The pricing of imbalance is changing as well. As there will be no longer production bal-
ance, the two-price model for production imbalances will disappear. Single imbalance 
pricing model will be applied from today’s consumption imbalance pricing. According to 
Article 7 of All TSOs’ proposal to further specify and harmonise imbalance settlement in 
accordance with Article 52 of EB GL, each TSO shall implement the use of single imbal-
ance pricing for all imbalances (ENTSO-E, 2018b). This can be interpreted, that also net-
ted imbalances will be subjected to imbalance price. In other words, imbalances during 
ISPs with no up or down regulation will be fined by imbalance price rather than PX mar-
ket price as of today. There is no framework established yet how the imbalance price will 
be calculated for these ISPs (Fingrid Oyj, 2018b). The change is significant, as according 
to ACER annual market monitoring report (C. ACER, 2018) over 70% of imbalances are 
netted in Nordic synchronous area. The estimated impact is that as imbalance price is less 
favourable for BRPs than PX market price, the change will incentivize BRPs to avoid 
imbalance settlement and fix their position in Intraday.    
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3.2 Balancing and reserves 
Balancing markets on both Pan-European level as well as the Nordics are undergoing 
large structural changes. The balancing market is expected to be more flexible, more in-
tegrated, cheaper, and most importantly facilitate new ways of balancing such as demand 
response. (EUR-Lex, 2017) In order to address the new challenges, the European Com-
mission in co-operation with ACER released a guideline for electricity balancing in No-
vember 2017. The regulation urges TSOs and DSOs to be in closer collaboration in order 
to integrate and harmonize balancing processes both internally and cross-zonal. The in-
fluence of EB GL regulation has implications on pan-European level, such as market in-
tegration of balancing markets and reserves. In addition, Nordic TSOs have common pro-
jects that aim to harmonize Nordic balancing.   
 
On the European level, the fundamental change is that some of reserve types shall operate 
on common pan-European platforms. With respect to EB GL requirements, ENTSO-E 
has established multiple projects to cope with new regulation. The common characteristic 
to these projects is integration of balancing platforms and setting common rules for bal-
ancing. The Nordic TSOs are taking part in two of these projects, MARI and PICASSO. 
The platform for International Coordination of Automated Frequency Restoration and 
Stable System Operation (PICASSO) is a project that targets implementation and opera-
tion of a Platform for automatic Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR). This platform 
is designed to be compliant with CACM, essentially integrating most of aFRR markets 
over Europe (ENTSO-E, 2018c). Manually Activated Reserves Initiative (MARI) is an-
other pan-European project Nordic TSOs take part in, which essentially has the same 
scope as PICASSO, just for different market, the mFRR. As these projects have been 
announced only recently, the go-live date is yet unknown.  
 
In addition to pan-European projects, the Nordic TSOs have also tightened collaboration 
around balancing markets in Nordic synchronous area introducing Nordic Balancing Con-
cept and roadmap. The key changes are targeted towards frequency restoration reserves. 
A fundamental structural change to all FRRs is to comply with 15-minute imbalance set-
tlement period, meaning that balancing products will shift to finer 15-minute resolution. 
The mFRR balancing market is expected to change from hourly to quarter hourly resolu-
tion at the same time as 15-minute imbalance settlement period is introduced, during Q2 
2020.   (Uusitalo, 2019) Other key deliverables are to merge national aFRR and mFRR 
capacity markets into two new common Nordic aFRR and mFRR capacity markets by Q2 
2019 and Q4 2019 respectively. In addition, a completely new quarter hourly balancing 
energy market, namely common aFRR energy market is planned to be introduced by Q1 
2021. (Statnett, 2019) 
 
There are also plans to change the gate closure of mFRR energy market. On 18th of De-
cember 2018 European TSOs have jointly proposed the gate closure of standard mFRR 
balancing energy product bids to be 25 minutes prior to beginning of quarter for which 
the bid is placed. This is expected gate closure time when 15-minute ISP is valid in Nor-
dics. (ENTSO-E, 2018d, pp. 18, Article 8)   
 
3.3 Intraday 
The Chapter 6 of the CACM Regulation specifies requirements for the SIDC, including 
a single methodology for pricing intraday cross-zonal capacity. CACM requirement on 
capacity pricing is to establish efficient pricing and reflecting market congestion, based 
on actual orders. (EUR-Lex, 2015, chap. 6) On 10th of August of 2017 all TSOs have sent 
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a proposal to regulators on cross-zonal intraday capacity pricing methodology, which has 
been approved by ACER decision on 24th of January 2019. TSOs proposal was to estab-
lish a hybrid model for intraday capacity pricing. This means that in addition to continu-
ous intraday market, there will be complimentary intraday auctions which would effec-
tively price the capacity. The decision states that there will be three additional intraday 
auctions after day-ahead for next day’s delivery. First to be held in the day D-1 with gate 
closure at 15:00, second one on D-1 with gate closure at 22:00 and the last one on day D 
with gate closure at 10:00, all times in CET. The decision, however, does not specify the 
resolution at which these intraday auctions should be held, thus leaving a big gap in un-
derstanding future market design. Given that ISP will move to 15-minutes, as will the 
balancing market, the market participants are put under pressure to trade on 15-minute 
intraday products instead of hourly intraday products. It is therefore somewhat unreason-
able to value the capacity on hourly resolution, as the full advantage will not be taken 
from the hybrid model. Moreover, according to the recital 12 of EB GL: “the harmoniza-
tion of imbalance settlement period to 15 minutes in Europe should support intraday trad-
ing and foster the development of a number of trading products with same delivery win-
dows”. With accordance to the recital 12 and deduction above, this thesis assumes that 
intraday capacity pricing methodology, specifically intraday auctions, will be held on 15-
minute resolution. As there has not been any intraday auctions in the Nordics, it is a great 
change to a market design. 
 
Another structural change that will affect continuous intraday market is introduction of 
rolling cross-zonal gate closure time. On 24th of April of 2018 ACER has released deci-
sion on all TSO’s proposal for intraday cross-zonal gate opening and intraday cross-zonal 
gate closure times (IDCZGCTs) (ACER, 2018a). According to the article 63 of the deci-
sion, the IDCZGCTs should be in relation to the start of the relevant intraday market time 
unit. It is further specified in article 64, that the relevant intraday market time unit corre-
sponds (i.e. is equal) to the imbalance settlement period, given that the ISP is the same 
across the border. Theoretically, as all countries should implement EB GL requirement 
of moving to 15-minute ISP latest by 2021, the whole continuous intraday market should 
operate on 15-minute IDCZGCTs. The regulation only obliges the gate closure to be in 
relation to ISP, sometimes called rolling gate closure, however, it does not specify how 
long before delivery should the IDCZGCT be. Already today the IDCZGCT is one hour 
before delivery, the change that will occur is that there will be four IDCZGCTs within an 
hour. The remoteness to start of the delivery might remain the same. Also, countries have 
a right to apply for an exemption of 15-minute ISP until year 2025, therefore this thesis 
will not assume that whole pan-European intraday market will move to 15-mintue ISP. 
Nevertheless, as all Nordic countries are planning to implement 15-minute ISP at the 
same time, and central European countries on the other side of Nordic interconnectors 
such as Germany and Netherlands already have 15-minute ISP, it can be assumed the 
whole intraday market around Nordics will move to 15-minute gate closure time. The 
impact is that market participants will have unified amount of time to utilize market in-
formation for each tradable quarter. Second significant change is that the quarter hourly 
gate closure will be cross-zonal, which means that there will be no local markets on quar-
ters before gate closure unless the capacity is used on the border. This creates deeper 
order depth closer to gate closure, which increases market efficiency, as the merit order 
is larger before gate closure than previously.  
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3.4 Day-ahead 
ACER released decision on algorithm methodology on 26th of July 2018. According to 
Article 4 of the decision, by August 2022 the price coupling algorithm shall be able to 
support all future requirements for algorithm methodology and all NEMOs shall be com-
pliant with it (ACER, 2018b). Specified in Annex II, one of the requirements is that for 
each bidding zone, the price coupling algorithm shall be able to facilitate orders for sev-
eral market time units, such as 15, minutes 30 minutes and hourly (ACER, 2018c). This 
statement implies that Day-Ahead algorithm, and thus all NEMOs being part of single 
day-ahead coupling, should be able to facilitate 15-minute resolution products in day-
ahead. However, the regulation does not explicitly state whether the 15-minute resolution 
products should be implied cross-border, i.e. over interconnectors. Essentially the regu-
lation states that PXs should by August 2022 provide 15-minute contracts, but these con-
tracts can be provided in local auctions. This arrangement would not have any benefit 
from market coupling, nor from interconnectors, as those are not applicable in terms of 
regulation. Therefore, by the means of regulation it has been undefined, when or if SDAC 
as we know it today will move to 15-minute resolution.  
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4 Purpose of 15-minute ISP 
There are areas in operating transmission grid to which quarter hourly resolution may be 
a great aid. First one, is the balancing of the transmission grid. The grid constantly needs 
balancing. If it wouldn’t, it would imply that BRPs are always in balance with each other. 
As this is not always the case, centralized balancing implies costs, the cost of balancing. 
Seemingly, the TSOs pay the costs of balancing, as they run the balancing market and 
procure the reserves. In the very end, the TSOs are responsible for stable frequency in the 
grid. However, TSOs can recover the costs from market participants in grid fees or from 
imbalance fees or any other fees paid to eSett (eSett Oy, 2015, chap. 8.1). Therefore, 
eventually the market pays for balancing, the BRPs themselves. As this is the case, it 
would be reasonable to subject the need of balancing to market forces, by making BRPs 
responsible for their own balance. From the system perspective, it would be beneficial 
that the need for balancing would diminish. Therefore, the 15-minute ISP is introduced, 
which is expected to shift responsibility of balancing more to market participants.  
Another issue that 15-minute ISP could contribute to is addressing the structural imbal-
ances of the grid. The underlying problem of Nordic synchronous area is that the grid 
cannot be balanced nationally, as each countries action within grid affect the whole Nor-
dic synchronous area. The result has been that in the Nordic synchronous area, the quality 
of the frequency has been declining ever since middle 2000’s (Nordic TSOs, 2016). Inef-
ficient balancing does not solely cause the weakened frequency quality. Mostly it is due 
to systematic imbalances of the grid, which arise from very nature of assets in the market 
operated on hourly resolution. 
 
There are situations discussed in next chapters, which explain why hourly model leads to 
inefficiencies in the market and balancing the grid. It is also discussed why introduction 
of 15-minute ISP, and complimentary 15-minute resolution on balancing market would 
address these inefficiencies.  
 
4.1 Inefficiencies in balancing grid on hourly ISP 
4.1.1 Netting imbalances within an hour 
When market participants trade in the market, eventually they fix their position for the 
delivery hour. They may alter their position up to gate closure of intraday, but eventually 
they will end up with some final position, the scheduled production or consumption. In 
some sense, it is promise of energy delivery for the delivery hour. As of today, the realized 
production/consumption is measured over the whole delivery hour and settled within 
hourly ISP. The length of hourly ISP bares a problem. It allows market participants to 
deviate their actual power production/consumption from the scheduled production/con-
sumption within the hour and still end up perfectly balanced. To avoid imbalance fees, 
BRP’s actualized position needs to be in balance with scheduled position only by the last 
second of the delivery hour. Essentially, BRPs can be instantaneously out of balance over 
the hour as long as imbalance surplus and deficit even each other out by the end of the 
hour. However, the instantaneous imbalance of BRPs contribute to the imbalance of the 
grid and TSO could activate balancing bid or countertrade. In these cases, BRPs receive 
no penalty for their behaviour as they are in balance with themselves within the ISP, but 
there might be a cost for the system. In such situations, the actualized cost for balancing 
grid is not paid by the party that caused need for balancing. The situation is illustrated in 
Figure 4:      
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Figure 2: Example of BRP’s opportunity to net intra-hourly imbalances  (Copenhagen Economics, 
2017) 
 
In the figure 2 flat x-axis blue line represents scheduled BRP production/demand. It is the 
quantity BRP is obliged to deliver over one hour. It can be seen from the figure, that 
actual BRP production/demand, the black trendline, is not equal to scheduled one. In the 
beginning of the hour, BRP’s actual balance is on a deficit while during the rest of the 
hour it is on surplus. If the surplus and deficit areas on the graph, the actualized over and 
under production/consumption energy, are equal, the BRP is in balance and faces no im-
balance fee.  
 
The situation is theoretical, as balancing products are activated with respect to state of the 
whole transmission grid, sometimes even whole synchronous area. In other words, micro 
imbalances of single BRPs not always result in macro imbalances of the system, as they 
can even each other out on micro level. Nevertheless, this phenomenon takes away re-
sponsibility of keeping grid in balance from BRP towards TSOs. Moreover, as of today, 
the balancing products are hourly. Thus, at least in theory; if system operator calls for 
balancing product, it might be in use for longer time than it is needed. The instantaneous 
imbalance of first 15-minutes of an hour, could lead to activation of hourly product. Thus, 
the product will run for 45 minutes extra, for cost that is higher than PX market price of 
electricity.  
 
There are generally two causes for behaviour depicted in figure 2. First cause is when 
BRP can control actual production, a thermal powerplant for example. The market par-
ticipant, BRP, sells some amount of electricity for each hour in Day-Ahead market for 
the next day. The scheduled production is stepwise, a fixed quantity over the hour, possi-
bly differing each hour. The thermal powerplant cannot cope with radical changes of 
scheduled production, thus is ramped up and down with much smoother ramp rate. This 
could be situation in Figure 2, when BRP is ramping up it’s generation for next hour, 
where presumably scheduled production is higher than during hour depicted in figure 2. 
Another cause is when BRP cannot control its output, either production (generally the 
solar or wind production) or demand. In such cases, market participant needs to estimate 
or forecast the aggregated position and fix the corresponding amount in market. Thus, 
when behaviour in figure 2 is extended over longer period, the situations described above 
lead to structural imbalances in the grid which will be discussed in chapter 4.2. 
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4.1.2 Price of an imbalance  
The hourly price of the balancing market is determined by the most expensive bid acti-
vated within the current hour. Therefore, the price of imbalance of the whole ISP can be 
determined by most expensive quarter. This makes all imbalanced BRPs suffer the high-
est possible imbalance fee, although they might not have contributed to such occurrence. 
Figure 3 below illustrates a real-life situation on 22nd of January 2016 from Nordic bal-
ancing market.  
 
Figure 3: Balancing price formation in Finalnd at quarters on 22nd of January 2016 (Fingrid Oyj, 
2018b) 
 
On the first three quarters of an hour the need for balancing was moderate and stable. The 
prices of the most expensive activated bids were somewhat mutually aligned, priced 
around 300 €/MWh. On the last quarter of an hour, the need for balancing was such order 
of magnitude, that the most expensive balancing bid had to be activated, resulting in a 
price cap of 3000€/MWh. As 3000€/MWh became the final upregulation price for the 
whole hour, it led to the situation where price of an imbalance for the hourly ISP did not 
reflect the (cheaper) cost of balancing for the first three quarters. Thus, all BRPs had to 
pay the same imbalance fee regardless of when each BRP contributed to the imbalance 
within an hour. If 15-minute ISP had been introduced, only the BRPs that were imbal-
anced during last quarter would have to pay market cap price for imbalance. The imbal-
ance fees would thus be evenly distributed. 
 
More to the same problem, there are occurrences in the balancing market, when very 
small balancing bids are activated only for short amount of time, say one quarter of the 
hour. This however sets balancing market price, thus the imbalance fee, for the whole 
hour. Therefore, all BRPs within the hour need to pay balancing market price for imbal-
ances that occurred only during short amount of time. This again leads to uneven distri-
bution of costs of imbalance settlement. 
 
4.1.3  Up-regulation and down-regulation within an hour 
There are situations where during the same hour, TSO activates both up-regulation and 
down-regulation bids. Such situation occurred for example on 12th of July 2018 in Finland 
at 9:00-10:00 CET, where up regulation was activated for 60 MWh and down-regulation 
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for -47 MWh.(Fingrid Oyj, 2019a) Because volume of up-regulation was higher than vol-
ume of down-regulation, the price of imbalance was the balancing market’s up-regulation 
price. Thus, parties contributing to down-regulation imbalance are fined by wrong prem-
ises. Such kind of occurrences are rare. They however express a phenomenon, that exam-
ining grid balance over an hour is loose timeframe, as the balance cannot be controlled.  
       
4.2 Structural imbalance of Nordic synchronous grid 
4.2.1 Structural imbalance during hour shifts 
The way today’s energy market functions, for each BRP, the scheduled consumption or 
production is determined hourly. For some BRPs it changes each hour, more than for the 
others. Essentially it means, that in single point of time, particularly the point when hour 
turns to next one, BRPs are obliged to different scheduled flow for next hour compared 
to previous one. Therefore, the generation or consumption needs to be ramped up or down 
whichever way the next hour’s position is allocated. Some assets can reach the scheduled 
production or consumption of next hour quicker than others, which leaves possibility for 
imbalances as there is no guarantee that all assets ramp with the same rate at the same 
time. Presumably, there is always some ramping needed to reach the next hour’s sched-
uled production or consumption. Depending on asset’s nature, there are some cases when 
BRPs can fix the same position for each consequent hour with block orders for example. 
Not all assets can ramp from scheduled production or consumption of previous hour to 
the next hour instantaneously, therefore the changes are done in advance. This frequently 
leads to situations when actual production/consumption of last quarter of previous hour 
is closer to the scheduled production/consumption of first quarter of next hour. This phe-
nomenon results in so called imbalance jumps, where in order to reach next hour’s equi-
librium production or consumption, the ramp time around hour shift contributes to the 
imbalance. The phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 4 below.     
 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of imbalance jumps with hourly and quarter hourly ISP (Copenhagen Econom-
ics, 2017) 
 
The upper part of figure 4 above depicts market behaviour of a BRP in an hourly imbal-
ance settlement period. The situation is reminiscent to figure 2. The trendline is actual 
BRPs production/demand. In hourly ISP the market participant’s scheduled position in-
stantly increases when the hour 1 changes to hour 2, as can be seen from the figure. The 
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market participant actual production/consumption, however, cannot comply with such 
change. The counterparty with whom the electricity was traded, different BRP, could po-
tentially comply with such change. Say hydro power producers could ramp their produc-
tion nearly instantaneously following the imbalance jump, thus leaving a large imbalance 
in the grid. If the 15-minute ISP would be introduced as is depicted in lower graph in 
figure 4, the scheduled BRP position would correspond to BRP’s actual position closer 
to real time. This would not remove the imbalance jumps, but it would make them signif-
icantly smaller, as can be seen from the figure.   
 
4.2.2 Structural imbalance with interconnector ramping 
The same issue with imbalance jumps becomes particularly evident with interconnectors 
extending from Nordic synchronous area. As previously mentioned, the day-ahead auc-
tion determines the flow on interconnectors via implicit allocation with respect to social 
welfare maximization. The flow on direct current interconnectors to outside the Nordic 
synchronous area can be physically tuned. In order not to stress the power system, High 
Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) interconnectors have a ramping limit of 600 MW for 
each hour. (Copenhagen Economics, 2017) More specifically the ramping is only allowed 
to happen during ± 10 minutes around the hour shift. The maximum ramping speed cur-
rently is 30 MW power per minute, thus resulting 600 MW ramping limit over the 20 
minutes. The interconnectors rarely reach ramping limits. When all interconnectors’ flow 
is aggregated however, there are occurrences when total flow is dominant in some direc-
tion, inside or outside the Nordic synchronous area. Interconnector flow is determined by 
aggregated scheduled position of BRPs, essentially by the imbalance jumps. HVDC in-
terconnectors ramp relatively quickly, 30 MW / minute / interconnector, thus following 
the imbalance jumps quite in real time. In order not to result in structural imbalances, rest 
of power system should keep up with the ramp rate of interconnectors. On more granular 
level the actual position of BRPs should follow scheduled position of BRPs much closer 
to real time, at least on aggregate not exceeding interconnector ramp speed. Figure 5 be-
low illustrates changes in imbalances during hour shifts from year 2016.   
 
 
Figure 5: Nordic power system average imbalances at hour shift in 2016  (Copenhagen Economics, 
2017, fig. 7) 
 
The figure 5 above displays median and maximum imbalances during hourly shifts in the 
Nordics per hour, based on all imbalances in 2016. As is seen from figure, even median 
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imbalances are quite large; 400 MW mostly but during morning peaks and day-change 
around 1000 MW. Maximum imbalances are of very impactful size, reaching many thou-
sands of MWs. To balance these quantities actions from TSOs are needed more than dur-
ing the rest of the hour, and even if no actions are taken the frequency quality will de-
crease, which has been the case for over a decade in Nordics already (Nordic TSOs, 2016, 
chap. 4). The important issue to understand is that these imbalances are systematic, stem-
ming from structure of power market and imbalance settlement. Therefore, to address 
these errors, a systematic change needs to be imposed.  
 
4.2.3 Systematic imbalances due to directional variables and fore-
casting error 
There are different kinds of errors related to forecasting of either the RES or load. A 
research on wind power forecasting accuracy in Finland has identified two main sources 
that cause error in forecasting: level and phase errors. Level errors are caused by system-
atically erroneous prediction, whereas phase errors are caused by forecasting level of pro-
duction correctly but failing to predict the timing of changes. (Holttinen et al., 2013) This 
ideology can be adapted to all forecasted variables in power system, including solar power 
and load, not just the wind power. The level errors, i.e. predicting the level of production 
wrong, are usually caused by badly configured forecasting model or error might be ran-
dom. The phase errors, i.e. error due to wrongly predicted timing of changes, are far more 
problematic than level errors. Phase errors are usually caused by changes in wind speed 
or timing of weather front on large geographical areas which could lead to substantial 
forecast errors. (Holttinen et al., 2013) 
 
In addition to level or phase errors, there is a systematic error imposed to the power sys-
tem of just systematically variable production or load. The systematic error is frequently 
related to the load swings or solar power production changes. The problem is, that even 
if the timing and level of these two variables is known, there is still imbalance imposed 
to power system. Let us consider power consumption in Finnish power system on January 
16th 2018, where consumption at 5.00 was 11 370 MW and in 8.00 it was 12 750 MW. In 
four hours, there has occurred an increase of demand by approximately 345 MW/h gra-
dient. There is however little error in demand forecast. The forecasts are done based on 
consumption metered data, giving accurate results and timing of the demand increase is 
easily predictable by historical data. It can be thus said, that market knows exactly the 
behaviour of consumption pattern. However, the imbalance is nevertheless imposed, as 
even though the gradient of increase is known exactly, only the hourly averages are sold 
on the market. This obliges counterparties, the sellers and buyers, to comply only with 
hourly production volumes, neglecting the precise gradient of consumption. However, 
there could be a counter argument, that as long as the production increases with the same 
gradient as consumption, the imbalances will be balanced in organic way. There is no 
guarantee to that however, as the hourly granularity does inform the gradient of tradable 
asset to the counterparty. If 345 MW/h is traded, the consumption might have upward 
trend while production used to satisfy some of the demand might have downward trend, 
such can be the case with wind power. This causes an imbalance. The same thing applies 
to solar power. The timing of solar power production is more or less known, as it is caused 
by sunrise and sunset. Solar power producers know that their generation will increase in 
the morning and decrease in the evening. There is thus no phase error for solar power. 
Unfortunately, producers just cannot inform the increase to the rest of the market. Let us 
assume a situation, where it is known that solar power will increase on summer morning 
by 100 MW/h. The solar power producer sells 50 MW/h on the market. The counterparty 
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that buys it, does not know the gradient of production. One could not tell if at the begin-
ning of the hour the production would be 0 MW and at the end 100 MW resulting in 50 
MWh of energy. The same amount of energy can be a result of a different gradient as 
well, say 40 MW and 60 MW during the beginning and the end of the hour respectively. 
If the gradients of production and consumption at BRP level do not match, it will result 
in imbalance of the system. 
 
There is thus a common characteristic causing systematic errors to power system. Both 
solar producers and consumers know their gradient of production/consumption precisely, 
they have no mechanism to inform about it to the market. In other words, the forecasted 
pattern is spot on accurate, but it cannot be informed as day-ahead has too gross granu-
larity. The hourly ISP is too big of a granularity for say consumers to follow the fluctua-
tions of the renewables and react to them. These systematic errors leave TSOs in unfor-
tunate situations, where TSO buy up-regulation in the beginning of the hour and buy 
down-regulation it in the end of the hour. The situation might be vice versa depending on 
the gradient of the variable. 
 
Let us consider an event, like for example on 21th of January 2019, where in Finland day-
ahead wind prognosis predicted wind power production increase from 180 MWh/h to 320 
MWh/h on hours 11:00 -17:00. The continuously updated forecast predicted increase 
from 260 MWh/h to 600 MWh/h for the same hours. The actualized wind power produc-
tion was 290 MWh/h to 820 MWh/h for the same hours, resulting in a level error com-
pared to day-ahead forecast. The continuously updating forecast gives market participants 
time to react to the changes in intraday market, but there is still a large level error of wind 
power produced compared to the continuous forecast.(Fingrid Oyj, 2017)  
 
The intraday market is not very liquid in Nordic countries, which results in a situation, 
that even if all the unpredicted electricity between day-ahead forecast and continuous 
forecast gets sold, it might be valued incorrectly as compared to day-ahead valuation. 
This is because very little fraction of demand is in the intraday market, which essentially 
leaves electricity to be traded between power producers, thus resulting in different market 
outcomes. The research by (Holttinen et al., 2013, p. 14) argues, that as forecast errors 
are penalized only about 50 % of the time, making wind power producers rather choose 
the imbalance settlement rather than intraday trading. Anyway, it seems that in these 
cases, wind power producers must either trade in low liquidity market or choose balance 
settlement, thus outsourcing system balancing to the TSO. 
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5 Impact of 15-minute ISP to the market 
 
It is difficult to state at the time thesis was written how the ACER algorithm methodology 
will be implemented. Even if day-ahead coupling as it works today will move to 15-mi-
nute resolution, electricity is traded at best 12 h before the first quarter of delivery. This 
is somewhat long time for accurate prediction of power demand/supply for such a small 
granularity as a quarter. Furthermore, if day-ahead auction will go to 15-minute resolution 
cross border, it will occur earliest on August 2022, whilst 15-mintue ISP will be imple-
mented one year prior to that. It can be therefore assumed, that at least for the near future 
after 15-minute ISP implementation, the most liquidity is in Day-Ahead auction on hourly 
products. However, the settlement occurs on 15-minute resolution, thus there arises a 
contradiction, how are hourly trades settled. For purposes of quarter hourly imbalance 
settlement, the volume of hourly trades made in day-ahead will be divided per each quar-
ter (Energiavirasto, 2018). Say, if 1000 MWh is traded per hour, it will be noted in the 
balance as 250 MWh per each quarter. However, merely dividing the hourly scheduled 
position evenly per quarter does not bring any benefit of 15-minute ISP, since market 
liquidity is not in quarter hourly resolution. Changing ISP to 15-minutes allows settlement 
provider to settle realized production / consumption in smaller increments. It thus makes 
possible fining the market participants for sub-hourly imbalances against scheduled po-
sition. The very problem lies in scheduled position being allocated over the whole hour, 
forcing market participants to commit to the position also during quarters. In essence, 
nothing will change to hourly ISP. Thus, to get full benefit of 15-minute ISP, there should 
be a market place for market participants to fix their quarter hourly position to correspond 
to their actual production or consumption in order to avoid imbalance fees. Therefore, 
after implementation of 15-minute ISP in one way or another, BRPs should be able to fix 
their quarterly position, to escape imbalance fees. The only market place that would suf-
fice needs of BRPs to fix their position is intraday. In the Nordics, this is not straight 
forward however, as there are concerns with liquidity.  
 
As previously discussed in chapter 2.2, efficient functioning of continuous intraday mar-
ket needs liquidity. A large pool of orders is needed for intraday to be efficient market-
place. At the moment, in the Nordics, there is only continuous intraday market. In 2018, 
Nord Pool’s Nordic and Baltic intraday market achieved all time high traded volumes 
with 8.3 TWh traded. The day-ahead market volume for the same region in 2017 was 396 
TWh (Nord Pool Group, 2018). According to ACER market monitoring report, in 2018 
the Nordic and Baltic intraday traded volumes accounted for only 1.8% of total demand, 
one of the poorest figures in whole Europe (C. ACER, 2018). Based on these figures, 
intraday liquidity is negligible compared to day-ahead liquidity in the Nordics. The pos-
sible explanation could be that all electricity demand is satisfied in the Day-Ahead mar-
ket. In intraday, there is little demand for electricity, thus historically the market place 
could have been a place for producers trade with each other to fine-tune their positions. 
Furthermore, as continuous intraday market will move to quarter hourly resolution, there 
will be four times more contracts. Presumably, the intraday liquidity will be even smaller 
on quarters, as already existing liquidity needs to be divided to even smaller granularity.   
 
Another problem with continuous intraday market is, that it does not establish a reference 
price on quarters. In this context the reference price is referred to as liquid market clearing 
price per product with availability of cross-border capacities. For instance, day-ahead 
price acts as a reference price for today’s hourly intraday trading. It is essentially the price 
around which the trading in intraday revolves, as all market participants have fixed their 
positions with that price in day-ahead market. Then again, just taking an hourly price and 
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replicating it to the quarters is not a valid method to price the quarters, as each quarter 
may have combination of different cross zonal capacities, demand or RES production. 
Moreover, continuous intraday market does not value capacity, as discussed before. This 
is not necessarily problem for market participants, however, the closer the time of trading 
is to delivery hour, the higher the chance that capacity will be used. In other words, in 
intraday market there is always uncertainty, that capacity will run out from exporting 
market area, suddenly increasing prices in importing area by some margin. As already 
discussed in chapter 2, already realized trades in such case may not necessarily be the 
most socially beneficial. This dilemma becomes particularly evident when power retailer 
or industrial customers are concerned, as parties on demand side, want to subject their 
purchase of power to competition. If there is no cross zonal capacity, the less liquidity, 
the less competition.   
 
At the same time, after introducing 15-minute ISP consumption metering will at least for 
the most part move to 15-minute resolution as well. According to article (Arora and Tay-
lor, 2016) smart meters give valuable information about retail consumers demand pat-
terns. These patterns can be further used to forecast electricity demand of retail customers. 
The higher the accuracy of the forecast the less error there is to procure the correct amount 
of electricity. As can be seen from eSett handbook (eSett Oy, 2015, chap. 7), consumption 
imbalance fees are higher than production imbalance adding an extra 7.5€/MWh on top 
of balancing market price. As the imbalance fines are high, it is highly doubtful, that 
electricity retailers would not use the quarter hourly resolution meter data in their fore-
casts. Thus, it can be presumed according to (Arora and Taylor, 2016), that accurate fore-
casting will transfer trading behaviour of market participants towards fixing  position on 
quarters. According to this logic, electricity demand for some part would shift towards 
intraday, as it is the only marketplace holding 15-minute products, given day-ahead will 
remain on hourly resolution. This means more liquidity in the intraday, but for reasons 
such as optimized clearing and aggregated volumes the liquidity might shift to intraday 
auctions. 
 
5.1 Intraday auction liquidity 
There are various countries that have implemented intraday auctions across the Europe, 
Spain, Ireland, Italy, Germany and Great Britain. However, few of them have imple-
mented quarter hourly ISPs as well. Of above mentioned countries, only Germany and 
Italy have quarter hourly ISP, whereas Italy has 15-minute ISP for production and 60 
minute ISP for consumption.(Frontier Economics, 2016) Analysing the market structure 
of Germany gives and insight how market has developed to cope with quarter hourly 
ISP. First of all it is important to note, that Germany has substantial amount of VRES 
installed in the power system, namely 45GW of wind power and 39 GW of solar photo-
voltaics (Gürtler and Paulsen, 2018). Therefore, quick ramping of generation occurs fre-
quently in Germany and with high amplitudes. The day-ahead auction in Germany is 
still hourly and holds the most liquidity. This is the expected market structure for the 
Nordics after implementation 15-minute ISP. Just as discussed in previous chapter, 
there should be some market where market participants can balance their positions on 
15-minute resolution. For those reasons market participants would choose a market with 
15-minute contracts available to trade. The analysis is subjected to German 15-minute 
intraday auction run by EPEX SPOT, which is auction that is expected to be the place 
for market participants to balance position after day-ahead auction. The 15-minute auc-
tion, sometimes in scientific literature referred to as Call auction, is held at 15:00 CET 
d-1, 3 hours after day-ahead gate closure (Epex Spot, 2019a). 
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The assumption is that liquidity is brought to intraday auction for market participants 
being able to fix their quarter hourly position. The causation that leads to such shift of 
liquidity is explained in figure below.  
 
 
Figure 6: Illustration of actual production versus scheduled production after Day-Ahead market  
 
The blue trend line in Figure 6 can depict one of three major variables unknown to market, 
the wind production profile, the load profile or the solar production profile before day-
ahead gate closure. At this point any of those three are forecasted profiles, as the trading 
occurs day-ahead. For this illustration wind production profile can be considered. The 
grey columns represent the amount of electricity traded (sold) in day-ahead market by 
market participant with respect to wind power output prognosis. The first hour is expected 
to produce total of 45 MWh and second hour is expected to produce 95 MWh. However, 
as there is 15-minute ISP, although electricity is traded hourly, the hourly traded volume 
is distributed over the consecutive quarters, as depicted in figure below. 
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Figure 7: Illustration of actual production and distribution of scheduled production on quarters in 
15-minute ISP  
    
In figure 7 the dark blue trend line is the same trend line as in figure 6. The difference is 
that hourly volumes are distributed over the quarters. Now there can be clearly seen that 
volume for individual quarters has been inaccurately allocated with respect to forecasted 
production. Therefore, for market participant to remain in balance within quarter hourly 
ISP, one must buy big chunk of electricity during first quarter, buy smaller amount of 
electricity at second quarter, sell small amount of electricity during third quarter and sell 
large chunk of electricity during last quarter of the hour. However, on the first quarter of 
next hour market participant should again buy electricity. Thus, there occurs repetitive 
behaviour for market participant with respect to the portfolio trend during consecutive 
hours. 
 
It is important to understand the scale of such repetitive behaviour in the market. Renew-
able power generation is dependent on weather patterns which usually affect large geo-
graphical areas. If there is such situation that market participant’s power production rap-
idly rises, it is most likely the case for many other wind power producers as well.  When 
the whole German market is considered, even if not all wind power is sold to the market 
or the favourable weather conditions apply only to some parts of Germany, such repeti-
tive, or directional, behaviour is still of substantial size. The figure 7 is just an illustration, 
in real life the demand profile or wind production profile would not be linear. By the 
directional behaviour in this case is meant that variable profile is clearly increasing or 
clearly decreasing, leading to situation that during each hour both buying and selling 
needs to occur in order to balance position of BRP. As this type of systematic, cyclical, 
trading behaviour occurs in discrete auction, it should be visible in auction prices as well. 
The hypothesis is, that there should be clear, visible patterns of quarter prices within an 
hour. The price level will most likely reset during next hour and follow the same pattern. 
The patterns or quarter hourly prices will change during the day, as directional behaviour 
of production or consumption goes systematically both ways during the same day.  
 
To test this, this thesis analyses price data of 15-minute German intraday auction during 
2018 compared to German day-ahead price data for the same time frame. Both auctions 
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were run by power exchange EPEX SPOT. Prices for each quarter of year 2018 from 15-
minute call auction as well as all 8760 hours from day-ahead auction are considered for 
this analysis. In order to find out if there is any directional behaviour in the data such as 
theory predicts, the average of contract prices is taken. The electricity price data is very 
cyclical; daily, weekly and seasonal cycles apply for the data. In order not to generalize 
the data and look over the seasonal cycles a small enough timeframe needs to be chosen 
for analysis. Then again, the timeframe cannot be too short in order not to include statis-
tical anomaly. The chosen timeframe for analysis of the data is one month. This timeframe 
is believed to find patterns in the data from decent number of contracts, but not to average 
the seasonal cycles. The monthly mean price for each contract has been calculated and 
displayed as daily profile. Therefore, for each price point the mean number of contracts 
is n=29, 30 or 31 depending by calendar month. When such profile is constructed it es-
sentially shows the average day in a month. The figure below is shows means contract 
prices of December 2018.  
 
 
Figure 8: EPEX intraday quarter hourly call auction prices compared to day-ahead prices of 
December 2018. Blue circles represent intraday auction prices on quarters, red circles represent 
hourly day-ahead prices. Filled circles represent beginning of the hour. 
 
The Figure 8 contains a blue line and red line. Blue line represents intraday auction prices, 
with circles indicating specific price per each quarter. Red line represents day-ahead 
price, with four circles in a row as hourly price is divided per four quarters. With such 
arrangement each quarter hourly price can be separately compared between intraday and 
day-ahead. The x-axis displays quarters in a day, of total 96 quarters. The filled circles 
ease noting start of each hour, but also help understanding the price behaviour of quarters 
around the day-ahead price. The first observation that can be done from the figure is that 
intraday price is generally more volatile than day-ahead price. The average lowest and 
highest price in the December for intraday market is 20.7 € and 67.9 € respectively. For 
day-ahead the figures are 32.1 € and 53.8 €. Therefore, the intraday auction market can 
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be considered more volatile. Another important observation from the figure is that each 
hour the price in intraday auction generally develops in certain direction. What is more 
remarkable, the directional pattern is replicated hourly, revealing so called zig-zag pat-
tern. The repetitive price pattern suggests a cyclicity of intraday auction price. In order to 
further analyse the data, the interval of cyclicity needs to be found. For this the matlab 
function of find peaks is used. 
 
[pks,locs] = findpeaks(data)     (5) 
 
pks = findpeaks(data) returns a vector with the local maxima (peaks) of the input signal 
vector, data. A local peak is a data sample that is either larger than its two adjacent sam-
ples or is equal to Inf. Whereas locs finds the location of the pks. 
 
Y = diff(X)      (6) 
 
Y = diff(X) calculates differences between adjacent elements of X along the first array 
dimension whose size does not equal 1. The matlab is asked to perform following calcu-
lation: 
 
cycles = diff(locs);         
meanCycle = mean(cycles)  
(Answer:)meanCycle = 4      
 
The command above calculated differences between adjacent locations of peaks. This 
gives a difference of locations, in this case number of quarters between peaks. The mean 
cycle of those locations is calculated, the answer being 4. This means that intraday prices 
peak every 4 quarters of average, meaning data is cyclical with respect to hourly cycles. 
The fact that intraday price data is cyclical around hourly cycles suggests that it is cyclical 
around day-ahead timeframe and presumably the day-ahead market. It is very logical that 
intraday auction follows hourly timeframe, as most of liquidity is on hourly contracts in 
day-ahead. What needs to be examined, is whether intraday auction prices follow the day-
ahead prices. If intraday auction prices follow the day-ahead prices, it suggests, that in-
traday quarter hourly auction is complimentary auction to day-ahead auction. If the prices 
of intraday auction are not following the day-ahead prices, it means that intraday auction 
is a separate, independent, quarter hourly market. One way to test this, is to compare the 
average prices of day-ahead auction and intraday auction.  
 
Table 1: Monthly average day-ahead and intraday call auction prices from 2018 and their difference 
 DA_averages IDA_averages Delta (DA-IDA) 
December 48.13 47.69 0.44 
November 56.30 56.45 -0.15 
October 53.02 52.43 0.58 
September 55.59 54.82 0.77 
August 55.93 55.76 0.16 
July 49.04 49.17 -0.13 
June 42.48 42.23 0.25 
May 32.60 31.95 0.64 
April 32.41 31.40 1.02 
March 37.82 37.99 -0.17 
February 39.81 40.02 -0.21 
January 29.47 29.10 0.36 
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Table 1 shows monthly average prices of day-ahead and intraday markets. The third col-
umn shows monthly differences between day-ahead and intraday mean monthly prices. It 
can be seen from the third column, that the average prices are systematically close to each 
other. The highest monthly average difference is 1.02 € in April. From the results of the 
table can be seen that both hourly and quarter hourly markets value electricity somewhat 
equally. Thus, the resolution of a market does not have significant impact on the daily 
price of electricity. The result can be justified, as intraday call auction occurs 3 hours after 
day-ahead market for the next day and little new information has reached market partici-
pants to have effect on trading behaviour, thus the prices. Nevertheless, the result is some-
what peculiar, as intraday auction has significantly smaller liquidity than day-ahead auc-
tion and is not subjected to any form of market coupling. The average prices are nonethe-
less very close to day-ahead prices, and systematically follow the monthly price level 
changes of day-ahead market. This heavily suggests, that intraday call auction is compli-
mentary market to day-ahead auction. This assumption supports the hypothesis. To follow 
the assumption, the price dynamics of intraday quarterly market needs to be examined 
against day-ahead market prices. 
 
Given that average quarter hourly auction prices do not deviate from average day-ahead 
prices does not yet tell that the prices are dependent. There is a possibility that two sepa-
rate markets systematically arrive to the same outcome. However, given that quarter 
hourly auction prices have local maxima’s and local minima’s every hour on average, not 
affecting the daily average price, suggests heavily that intraday auction price follows day-
ahead price pattern. This is visible from figure 9, as monthly average day ahead price is 
for the most part between hourly local maxima and local minima of monthly average 
quarter hourly prices. In order to find out the dependency between price patterns of day-
ahead auction and intraday auction the location of quarter hourly price peaks need to be 
analysed, and check whether those correspond with the hypothesis. The figure below is 
used to clarify this. 
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Figure 9: Day-Ahead and Intraday auction monthly average price profiles of February 2018. Circles 
in left figure represent hourly prices and circles in right figure represent quarter hourly prices. 
 
In figure 9 there are two price figures, the first one is average day-ahead daily profile 
from February 2018 and the second one is average daily intraday call auction profile from 
February 2018. By average daily profile is meant, that each price point in a figure repre-
sents average of all prices of current contracts within a month. Thus, when all contracts 
are considered average daily profile of a month is formed. The figure with 24 contracts is 
from day-ahead market, the right one and figure with 96 contracts is from intraday call 
auction, the left one. The figures look similar, but what is worth noting is the shape of the 
day-ahead graph. As the graphs are averages for one month, the price patterns are quite 
systematic. First, there is moderate decrease of price during first four hours, followed by 
rapid increase of price during the morning hours. The price then rapidly drops, followed 
by sharp spike, i.e. rapid increase and following drop. The intraday auction price pattern 
is reminiscent to day-ahead price pattern. In the next figure the two price patterns are 
made to overlap, showing essentially the same figure as figure 8 before, just for February. 
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Figure 10: EPEX intraday quarter hourly call auction prices compared to day-ahead prices of 
February 2018. Blue circles represent intraday auction prices on quarters, red circles represent 
hourly day-ahead prices. Filled circles represent beginning of the hour. 
 
In Figure 10, the blue line depicts monthly average intraday call auction prices whereas 
the red line depicts monthly average day-ahead prices. The filled data points represent 
beginning of each hour. Let us analyse how intraday price peaks align with day-ahead 
price and whether there is any consistency. The remarkable observation is, that when day 
ahead prices decrease, the price peak of intraday call auction is always on the first quarter 
of an hour, whereas when the day-ahead prices increase the price peak of quarter hourly 
auction is always on the last quarter of an hour. During the first four hours, when day-
ahead prices decline, the peak prices of quarter hourly auction are on first quarters. When 
day-ahead prices begin the rapid increase, the peak prices of intraday auction are on last 
quarters. When the day-ahead price peak during the day starts descent, the intraday auc-
tion hourly price peaks are again during first quarter. The same behaviour is clearly visi-
ble for the next peak as well. The peak hourly prices of intraday auction (local maxima’s) 
occur only during the first or last quarter, with precisely 3 exceptions, which are the piv-
oting points, when day-ahead price increase turns into decrease. The exceptions occur 
during hour 4, 9 and 19, which are precisely the day-ahead local minima, local maxima1 
and local maxima2 respectively.  
 
There thus can be clearly seen differences between price patterns of day-ahead and intra-
day auction. From Figure 10 it can be seen, that intraday auction price follows price pat-
tern of day-ahead market price in very structured manned. It is also more volatile around 
it on hourly cycles. This can be explained by too large contract resolution of day-ahead 
market to satisfy market participants positions on 15-minute ISP. Day-ahead gives a uni-
form market price for each quarter within an hour. Also, the day-ahead price experiences 
daily fluctuations due to phenomena’s which occur linearly over time, not in hourly in-
crements. Therefore, the layered or stepwise hourly pricing in day-ahead auction creates 
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a systematic error in pricing the electricity, just like discussed in hypothesis. According 
to findings presented above, the intraday auction tends to correct the pricing error of day-
ahead market. This explains the positioning of quarter hourly peaks in intraday auction 
data against day-ahead price. When day-ahead price rapidly increases as is observable 
from Figure 10, the quarter hourly prices indicate, that the first quarter of the day-ahead 
contract is overpriced, whereas last quarter of day-ahead contract is underpriced. The 
quarter hourly prices in the intraday auction are therefore low for first quarter and high 
for the last quarter. The price pattern is vice versa when day-ahead price is declining, 
where first quarter is underpriced, and last quarter overpriced. Therefore, the intraday 
auction pattern is very structured. Based on these observations it can be said that intraday 
auction is a complimentary market to day-ahead market.  
 
In order to properly understand the nature of zig-zag pattern of quarter hourly intraday 
call auction prices, the amplitude of fluctuations of quarter hourly prices in intraday call 
auction need to be analysed. When analysing intraday auction fluctuations, it is important 
to note, that day-ahead price also fluctuates. The day-ahead price just like any auction 
price is determined by intersection point of demand and supply; the volumes offered by 
market participants. If price fluctuates, it means that intersection point between demand 
and supply moves on the price scale up or down. Therefore, price fluctuations are result 
of changes in demanded volume against supplied volume. The factors that cause the fluc-
tuation of price in day-ahead on short term, are the same factors which force market par-
ticipants to fix their position on quarter hourly resolution; the fluctuation in demand and 
variable renewable energy sources (VRES). In other words, it is the same phenomenon 
that causes fluctuations of price in day-ahead and zig-zag pattern in intraday call auction. 
 
The “zig-zag” pattern reflects volatility of intraday auction. It is volatility of intraday-
auction prices. The price volatility was predicted in the hypothesis and explained by error 
in allocated volume against actual volume of VRES or demand. If this is so, the intraday 
call auction price volatility should increase hand in hand with day-ahead price volatility. 
This is based on logic, that if day-ahead price rapidly increases, there is swift change of 
circumstances in supply-demand curve, given that market is liquid and not manipulated. 
For example, in the morning the day-ahead price might rapidly increase due to rapidly 
increasing demand whereas during the day prices might decrease due to flood of solar 
power to the market. It is not concern of this thesis what factors exactly drive the elec-
tricity prices in any direction and thus cause volatility. Given that volatility in electricity 
market occurs, some of variable factors as VRES production or demand swings are dom-
inant and cause volatility both in intraday and in day-ahead. Thus, the hypothesis is that 
the higher the price swings in day-ahead price the higher the price swings in intraday 
price around the hour. This is because, the higher price changes in day-ahead, the more 
there is error in allocated volumes in day-ahead and thus the more there is to correct on 
quarters in intraday-auction. This should be seen in the data. 
 
As the day-ahead data shown for example in figure 9, is a compiled average of contracts 
during the month, it is difficult to analyse volatility of such short sample. In order to 
properly compare volatility between day-ahead market and intraday market both datasets 
should be analysed as strings, however the strings would have different length thus mak-
ing the analysis difficult. Therefore, the data representation will stick to the same depic-
tion as before, in this case the volatility of day-ahead price is basically the price increase 
or decrease. In the figure 11 below there is presented average day-ahead profiles of Jan-
uary 2018 and August 2018. 
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Figure 11: Day-Ahead monthy average prices in January and August 2018. Circles in left figure 
represent hourly prices and circles in right figure represent quarter hourly prices. 
 
In the figure 11 above can be seen daily average profiles of January 2018 (the left graph) 
and of August 2018 (the right graph). Just as in earlier figures, each dot represents an 
average price of an hourly contract during the whole month. It can be seen from the figure 
that the daily profiles are different between these two months. They both start with de-
creasing price pattern during first 5 hours, after which starts rapid increase in prices. After 
the morning peak happens the differential part. In January (the left graph) prices remain 
stable for 8 hours or so after experiencing evening peak followed by decrease of prices. 
In August (the right graph) the prices undergo sharp decline before the evening peak and 
consecutive decrease in prices. In august the day-ahead prices experience more fluctua-
tion, i.e. up and down movement. However, the morning peak is sharper in January’s 
prices, but evening peak is sharper in August’s prices. It is also important to note, that 
January and August prices are on different price scale in figure 11. 
 
The figures below display the intraday auction volatility of the same months which’ day-
ahead price pattern was depicted in figure 11 above. At this point it is important to under-
stand, that volatility in this case means what pattern the prices take within a day. By vol-
atility is not meant the volatility of single price point during the period of analysis. 
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Figure 12: Volatility of Intraday call auction prices against day-ahead prices in January 2018. Thick 
red line represents day-ahead price, violet line represents intraday auction price. 0-axis line 
represents day-ahead price, while blue trandline revolves around it. Filled circles represent 
beginning of the hour. 
 
Figure 12 above shows volatility of intraday auction prices in January 2018. The thick 
red line represents hourly day-ahead prices, with each hour extended to four quarters. The 
violet line represents intraday-auction, revolving around the day-ahead prices. The blue 
line represents intraday-auction prices with average component removed. In other words, 
blue line is obtained from subtracting day-ahead price from intraday price. The day-ahead 
price is now the 0-axis and blue line of intraday price revolves around in. The intraday 
data just like day-ahead data is monthly average from January. The filled blue dots rep-
resent the first quarter of each hour. From the blue line the volatility of intraday auction 
can be relatively easily seen, as intraday auction price fluctuates around fixed axis. 
 
It can be seen from the figure 10, that intraday auction price volatility follows the day-
ahead price fluctuations. When there is decrease of day-ahead prices during first hours of 
the day, the fluctuation of quarter hourly prices is between 10€ and -10€ which then de-
creases when day-ahead price reaches local minima. When rapid increase of day-ahead 
prices occurs during morning peak the volatility of intraday auction fluctuations increase 
dramatically. When day-ahead price starts mid-day plateau phase, the volatility of quarter 
hourly price decrease significantly, nearly to inexistent. However, when day-ahead price 
reaches evening peak, the volatility somewhat increases, but it increases even more so 
when drastic drop of day-ahead prices is seen. For the comparison figure below depicts 
intraday auction price fluctuation of August, where day-ahead price only moves steeply 
up or down without any plateau phase, as visible from figure 11. 
38 
 
 
Figure 13: Volatility of Intraday call auction prices against day-ahead prices in August 2018. Thick 
red line represents day-ahead price, violet line represents intraday auction price. 0-axis line 
represents day-ahead price, while blue trandline revolves around it. Filled circles represent 
beginning of the hour. 
 
The figure setup of Figure 13 is the same as in Figure 12. The colours of the lines are the 
same and the lines depict same prices as in Figure 12. From Figure 13 it can be seen that 
volatility of quarter hourly prices is somewhat constant. The only occurrences when vol-
atility of intraday auction prices is low is when the day-ahead price curve changes the 
direction, i.e. hits the local maxima or local minima. The exception to this is when day-
ahead price reaches local maxima, the first peak of the day, the intraday auction prices 
are volatile. Essentially the decrease of volatility has happened prematurely an hour be-
fore the peak, on hour 8. Based on this observation, volatility, that is amplitude of peaks 
and crests of intraday auction prices correlates with slope of the day-ahead price. As day-
ahead price is constantly changing in August the volatility remains constant, as it should, 
because the pricing error of day-ahead is uniform around the day on average. 
 
When comparing the Figure 10 and Figure 11 together, there arises a question, why does 
volatility of intraday auction prices reach higher amplitudes in January during day-ahead 
price increases and decreases compared to August. There might be several explanations 
to this, however also in this case the slope of day-ahead prices can be addressed. In Jan-
uary day-ahead price increased on average 24€ during hours 5.00 AM to 10.00 AM. In 
August during the same hours the prices increased on average 17 €. As morning price 
peak in January went through quicker increase in prices, the intraday auction volatility is 
higher as well than compared to August. There can be seasonal components that affect 
the intraday auction price volatility as well as price levels could affect the volatility as 
price can have different elasticity at different price levels. However, it can be seen form 
the data of figures 12 and 13, that intraday auction volatility tends to correlate with steep-
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ness of day-ahead price curve, rather than with price level of day-ahead market. Gener-
ally, the quarter hourly price volatility follows the day-ahead price fluctuations. The more 
there is Day-ahead pricing error to correct the higher the intraday auction price fluctua-
tions and vice versa. This is in line with hypothesis.  
 
As volatility of intraday auctions is considered from monthly contract averages, it is very 
important to analyse the standard deviation of the prices as well. When average of prices 
is taken over a period of time, only the systematic part is depicted, it is important to pay 
attention to deviations as well. There is a peculiar observation, that standard deviation of 
monthly quarter hourly prices also follows the cyclical pattern as can be seen from Figure 
14 below. 
 
 
Figure 14: Standard deviations of respective quarter hourly contract prices of January 2018. Blue 
circles represent intraday auction prices on quarters, green circles represent the standard deviations 
of respective prices. Filled circles represent beginning of the hour. Upper y-axis line represents 
monthly average price, lower y-axis line represents monthly average standard deviation. 
 
Figure 14 has two trendlines, blue and green. The blue trendline depicts a monthly aver-
age of intraday call auction prices from January 2018. The green trendline depicts stand-
ard deviation for each respective intraday auction contract price. Every filled circle is the 
first quarter of an hour thus signifying the beginning of each hour. There are also two flat 
lines in the figure, the upper flat line is the average price of 15-minute intraday auction 
in January 2018 and lower line is average standard deviation of prices in January 2018. 
First observation from the figure is that standard deviation on average is quite high. The 
average prices are around 30€/MWh and average standard deviation is around 20 €/MW, 
thus about 60 % to 70 % of the average price. For some specific contracts, the standard 
deviation is even higher than the average price itself, signifying very volatile prices of 
intraday auctions. It is visible from figure, that standard deviation in intraday auction 
contract prices follows the same cyclical pattern as the intraday auction prices themselves. 
40 
 
This is a very peculiar finding. The cyclicity of intraday call auction prices was explained 
by dependency from day-ahead prices. The cyclicity of standard deviation is difficult to 
explain by day-ahead trading. When the same set of commands in MATLAB is performed 
as introduced previously, the mean cycle of peaks for standard deviation is 3.8, which 
means that the peaks do not strictly follow the day-ahead timeframe, however the cy-
clicity is evident. When analysing the relation of intraday quarter hourly price peaks to 
standard deviation peaks, an interesting pattern is found, when intraday prices reach local 
maxima, usually the standard deviation reach local minima, and vice versa. As it is known 
that intraday auction prices peak in very systematic manner every hour and, depending 
from direction of day-ahead price, the peak is either the first quarter or the last quarter 
makes the finding even more peculiar. Essentially it tells, that there is systematic behav-
iour of standard deviation for contracts within an hour. Very important finding is, that 
standard deviation is alternating, not constant. It is also found out, that standard deviation 
alternates within hourly timeframe, against the direction of intraday quarter hourly price, 
thus the day-ahead price as well. It is very difficult to find a causation for such behaviour; 
more research needs to be done on the topic to find conclusion. What can be said from 
the observation, is that generally when quarter hourly peaks, the so-called market forces 
tend to agree on the price, thus the standard deviation is lowest. It could be thought that 
high prices alternate in smaller range than low prices. When quarter hourly prices within 
an hour are low, the standard deviation tends to increase, which means, that market forces 
cannot agree how cheaply the electricity can be valued. This behaviour could stem from 
price elasticity of demand. Low intraday auction price usually means that a lot of elec-
tricity is sold, and as little demand reacts to change in price level, the prices can drop even 
to negative values. From the figure it can be found that prices are more volatile down-
wards, and less volatile upwards.      
 
5.2 Previous literature 
There has been previous research conducted on econometrics of intraday auctions by 
(Kiesel and Paraschiv, 2017). The research article had identified the same “zig-zag” pat-
tern on intraday call auction prices. The baseline for explaining the zig-zag pattern has 
however been completely different than is this thesis. The article (Kiesel and Paraschiv, 
2017) argues that zig-zag pattern occurs ultimately from updated forecasts of either re-
newables such as solar and wind or from demand. The article’s main assumption is that 
the electricity intraday price formation process depends on how much traditional capacity 
has been allocated in the day-ahead market and in which proportion it covers the fore-
casted demand (Kiesel and Paraschiv, 2017). Therefore, the intraday price behaves ac-
cording to change of forecast compared to already allocated capacity in the day-ahead 
market. This thesis does not contradict with such assumption nor results. Forecasting er-
rors will be discussed later in this thesis. However, there is clearly differential of inter-
pretation of intraday zigzag pattern between these two studies.  
 
The article has clearly identified the possible trading behaviour which would lead to such 
zig-zag pattern. In the Figure 3 of the article it is explained by systematic solar production 
ramp-up. Article argues that solar power producers sell hourly mean production quantity 
to day-ahead market, but as actual solar production is not in line with hourly day-ahead 
production schedule, market participants are forced to participate in intraday continuous 
market. As solar production is ascending in the morning, there is buy pressure in the first 
quarters of an hour and sell pressure on the last quarters of an hour. For the evening as 
sun descends, the buy-sell pressure is reversed. The zig-zag pattern therefore is descend-
ing in hourly cycles in the morning and ascending in hourly cycles in the evening.     
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This is where this thesis disagrees with the article with by (Kiesel and Paraschiv, 2017). 
The   data for the article is said to be from 01/01/2014-01/07/2014. The data from 2018 
used in this thesis for those months does not follow the patterns depicted in figure 3 of 
the article. This means, that the analysis is not reproducible. Even in the sunny months 
such as June and July the price pattern of intraday auction price is contradictory with the 
direction of peaks compared to the results of the article. This means, that explanation for 
zig-zag pattern provided by the article is not comprehensive. It could be, that intraday 
continuous zig-zag pattern analysed in article differs from intraday auction zig-zag pat-
tern, but it is unlikely. Furthermore, the article has chosen only hours 8-19 of zig-zag 
pattern for the analysis explained by solar production, which takes away credibility of 
results, as the zig-zag pattern is visible over the whole 24 hours of a day. The article 
acknowledges that in figure 4, stating that such zig-zag pattern was observable also during 
the so-called off-peak hours 20.00-08.00. In the article, the zig-zag on off-peak hours 
(20.00-08.00) is explained by production design of fossil power plants or power-intensive 
industry. It is not however explicitly stated how is it explainable by fossil power plants 
or power-intensive industry. An important factor which is left uncovered in analysis by 
the article, is the connection between figure 3 and figure 4. Exactly at hours 19.00-20.00, 
where the figures 3 and 4 are split, the zig-zag pattern changes directions. This change of 
directions is not explained or referred in the analysis. According to figure 3 in the article, 
the sun is still shining at 19.00, therefore why would the direction of price pattern change, 
is left uncovered. To further enhance the differences between the article by (Kiesel and 
Paraschiv, 2017), no analysis on volatility nor on amplitude of the peaks has been con-
cluded by the article. In the figure 3 the solar generation curve has been presented which 
is believed to cause the zig-zag behaviour. The during hours 8.00-13.00 the gradient of 
solar production is clearly steeper than during hours 13.00-16.00. In fact, the solar gradi-
ent is nearly flat during hours 13.00-16.00. The auction price is still nearly as volatile as 
it was during morning hours. According to article, the volatility of intraday auction prices 
should be clearly higher on morning hours than on mid-day, however this is not explained. 
There is thus a gap in research on comparison of intraday auction price peaks compared 
to day-ahead prices and on volatility analysis of intraday auction price peaks, which sig-
nify the struggle of day-ahead auction to value quarter hourly electricity correctly. 
 
Generally, article explains the zigzag pattern by systematic behaviour of generation as-
sets. I.e. solar generation has some sort of systematic behaviour; therefore, the intraday 
continuous price develops a complimentary way systematic behaviour. To some extent 
this thesis also agrees with this assumption. The article states that forecasting errors will 
put pressure on traditional suppliers to reduce production, since renewables are fed into 
the grid with priority. This thesis has different approach towards the phenomenon. This 
thesis believes that zig-zag pattern of intraday auction price is the correction of positions 
against day-ahead market due 15-mintue ISP. Therefore, this thesis considers 15-minute 
call auction to be of complementary nature to day-ahead auction. According to this thesis 
the price pattern of intraday auction will always follow day-ahead auction regardless of 
generation, demand, renewables, or any circumstances. Although this thesis has noted the 
same variables as the article, namely solar generation, wind generation and demand, it is 
never possible to explain the zigzag pattern by only one of these variables, as reality is 
always a combination of these three. Therefore, there has to be comprehensive approach 
to explain the price pattern of intraday-auction, and according to this thesis it is the com-
plimentary nature to day-ahead auction. 
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The article has acknowledged the zig-zag behavior of intraday continuous prices and also 
found the cyclicity, however it does not analyze the amplitudes of intraday auction peaks 
neither does it run comparison of it against day-ahead market price.    
 
5.3 Systematic pricing error of day-ahead auction 
Up to this point it has been identified that intraday auction prices are cyclical around 
hourly day-ahead prices. The behavior of quarter hourly price peaks has been analyzed 
and found that direction of peaks is nearly always aligned with day-ahead price patterns. 
The phenomenon was explained by day-ahead granularity being too large and thus result-
ing in erroneous price on quarters for continuous variables such as VRES production and 
demand fluctuations. To test this the intraday auction price volatility was compared 
against day-ahead price fluctuations and found, although not explicitly, that intraday auc-
tion volatility generally follows day-ahead price fluctuations. The higher the day-ahead 
price fluctuation the higher the pricing error on quarters to adjust in intraday auction thus 
the higher volatility of intraday auction prices. It is all logical, however, there arises a 
question of why intraday auction prices fluctuate more within an hour than previous and 
next day-ahead hourly prices if intraday auction quarter hourly prices were only to fix the 
error of day-ahead price on quarters. The figure below illustrates the dilemma. 
 
 
Figure 15: EPEX intraday quarter hourly call auction prices compared to day-ahead prices of March 
2018. Blue circles represent intraday auction prices on quarters, red circles represent hourly day-
ahead prices. Filled circles represent beginning of the hour. 
 
The figure 12 above shows average day-ahead and average intraday prices on March 
2018. Blue line depicts intraday call auction prices, each filled dot signifies first quarter 
hourly contract of an hour whereas dots with no fill signify the other contracts of an hour. 
The thick red line depicts day-ahead price, where filled red dots indicate the beginning of 
each hour. It can be seen from figure that intraday auction prices during certain hours 
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range more than consecutive day-ahead prices. Let us take into consideration the evening 
day-ahead price peak, the second peak in the figure on hours 17.00-20.00, or on quarters 
68-80. It can be seen that intraday auction prices are so volatile, that local peaks exceed 
the day-ahead price of next hours and hours after that. The explanation for intraday vola-
tility was day-ahead pricing error on quarters. If intraday auction were to correct day-
ahead pricing error on the quarters, why does it not happen within the boundary of adja-
cent hourly price limits set by day-ahead market. Let us go back to theory in figure 7. Let 
us consider that figure 7 reflects increasing demand of whole market and the analysis will 
be about pricing the situation in figure 7. Price on 1st quarter of first hour in figure 7 would 
be the cheapest, price on second quarter would be cheaper than day-ahead price third 
quarter would be more expensive than day-ahead price and fourth quarter would be more 
expensive than day-ahead price. The price of the first quarter of second hour should def-
initely be higher than day-ahead price of first hour. This is because day-ahead market has 
valued electricity based on the volumes. If first quarter of second hour would be cheaper 
than last quarter of first hour, it would mean, that consuming more electricity would cost 
less. Given that day-ahead market values electricity hourly, the valuation threshold of 
quarters will also be hourly, therefore the lowest price for first quarter of second hour 
should be at minimum the day-ahead price of previous hour. Under no circumstances, at 
least not systematically, should the intraday auction price go below the day-ahead price 
of previous hour. If we consider again figure 15, it is exactly what is happening. Is there 
a paradox, why does average prices of intraday auction follow day-ahead auction price 
hand in hand but quarter hourly prices do not respect the hourly valuation of electricity 
in day-ahead. The day-ahead market has significantly higher liquidity than intraday auc-
tion. Therefore, there is little ground to question hourly valuation of electricity on day-
ahead. Tus, what most likely is happening, is that intraday quarter hourly auction actually 
does not value the price of energy. The theoretical considerations presented in Figure 7 
are based on trading behaviour of single market participant. The phenomenon that causes 
such behaviour applies to great many market participants, which eventually affects the 
whole market depicting the behaviour in form of market price.  
 
Let us consider market participant’s allocated volume, just like in figure 7. Now there 
will be price component added to the figure, on a second y-axis. For simplification rea-
sons, let this be a market where price and allocated volume are always the same. Figure 
16 illustrates such situation: 
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Figure 16: Illustration of intraday auction price formation and volume allocation based on day-ahead 
prices and allocated volumes. Green line represents volume allocated in day-ahead, but also price of 
the allocated volume.  
 
In Figure 16 there is green line and grey columns. The green line represents hourly day-
ahead price but also hourly day-ahead allocated volume. The volume is on left Y axis and 
the price is on right Y axis. Let us suppose that figure 16 represents increasing demand 
and thus the allocated volume is purchase from the market. The grey columns represent 
how the allocated volume looks like after intraday auction, in order to satisfy the 15-
minute ISP condition. The allocated volume over green line means market participant had 
to buy extra electricity in the auction whereas empty areas under the green line means 
that market participant had to sell electricity in the auction. Let us consider the situation. 
During the first hour the allocated volume on day ahead market is 45 MW at price 45 €. 
The day-ahead price the increases during second hour to 95 € and allocated volume fol-
lows to 95MW. The price increase is linear with volume increase, and in order for market 
participant to be in balance one should allocate the volumes in ascending manner, just 
like depicted. Let us consider third quarter of first hour. In order to respect the day-ahead 
electricity pricing the third quarter should cost 52€, the value of third column, but also 
market participant should have 52 MW allocated on that quarter. The market participant 
is therefore short of 7 MW and needs to buy it in intraday auction. 
 
Let us imagine situation where market participant buys 7 MW in intraday auction on third 
quarter at the quarter’s real market price. The real market price is in this case 52€, as can 
be seen from figure 16. The allocated volume would look in this case 45 MW per quarter 
from day-ahead auction at price 45 € and 7 MW from intraday auction at price 52 €. The 
average price of the allocated electricity would be: 
 
45 𝑀𝑊 ∗  45 € / 𝑀𝑊 +  7 𝑀𝑊 ∗  52€ /𝑀𝑊 =  2389€  (7) 
2389 € / 52 𝑀𝑊 =  46 € / 𝑀𝑊 
 
The final price ended up being 46€ / MW, which is not the market price, the 52 € / MW. 
In order for market price to realize, the intraday auction price on the specific quarter 
should be: 
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𝑋 €
52 𝑀𝑊
 =  52 € / 𝑀𝑊 ↔  𝑋 =  2704 €  (8) 
𝑌 =  
2704 € −  45 𝑀𝑊 ∗  45 €/𝑀𝑊
7 𝑀𝑊
 =  97 €/𝑀𝑊  
 
The intraday auction price which should be given for 3rd quarter is 97 € / MW, which is 
higher than day-ahead price of the second hour. This is exact phenomenon we see in 
actual intraday auction prices from figure 15. 
 
This can be interpreted that realized quarter hourly intraday auction price actually does 
not price the energy, but prices the error of day-ahead price on quarters. More specifically, 
it is not the energy traded on the quarters like in day-ahead, more like, the error between 
day-ahead hourly price and day-ahead quarter hourly price is traded on intraday auction. 
The day-ahead auction is the most liquid one, and market participants fix most of their 
positions already in day-ahead market. The intraday auction volumes are much smaller 
than day-ahead auction volumes. Therefore, higher volatility of quarter hourly prices oc-
curs to fix the DA pricing error for the whole portfolio already allocated in day-ahead 
market. This finding completely denies the claim that intraday auction is separate market, 
which values energy prices in quarters. The purpose of intraday call auction is to fix day-
ahead quarter hourly pricing, by measuring the error by setting a price for it.  
 
The exceptionally high quarter hourly price spreads seen in Figure 15, show that there is 
steep day-ahead quarter hourly price increase between hours 6.00 and 8.00. The day-
ahead price increases from 31€/MWh to 45 €/MWh in just two hours. Situation is remi-
niscent to illustration of figure 16. The intraday auction price indicates, that the prices 
need to be extra high on last quarters of the hour and extra low on first quarters of the 
hours to fix the pricing error that day-ahead auction has left on quarters. The intraday 
auction price thus does not reflect the price of energy, but the error of day-ahead auction.   
 
Hence, intraday auction does not show the real market price for the quarter, rather the 
weighted average of intraday and day-ahead market is the real market price. 
 
5.4 Forecasting error for the liquidity in intraday 
The intraday call auction is not necessarily only about fixing the day-ahead positions. In 
addition to systematic need for market participants to balance their quarter hourly posi-
tions after day-ahead, there is also random component of forecasting errors bringing li-
quidity to intraday. Study by (Hagemann and Weber, 2013) finds that intraday liquidity 
stems mainly from the wind forecast errors, the solar forecast errors and the load forecast 
errors. Essentially the article says, that forecast errors of above-mentioned factors are 
traded in intraday in order not to suffer imbalance settlement fees. The forecast errors can 
thus be expected to influence the intraday prices as well. It is important to note, that the 
article analyses data from 2010-2011, when there has not yet been 15-minute intraday 
call auction in Germany. Thus, the findings in article are found to be valid for hourly, 
continuous intraday market. The big difference between continuous intraday market and 
auction market, is that continuous intraday market extends up to one hour before the de-
livery. There is thus plenty of time for updated wind forecasts to arrive which enables 
market participants to utilize the latest and continuously updating forecast in their trading 
behaviour. The intraday auction however, EPEX call auction in particular, occurs only 
three hours after day-ahead gate closure. During those three hours the forecasts might not 
change significantly, thus there might not be much liquidity originating from forecast 
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errors, and therefore that might not be seen in prices. Another reason why forecast errors 
are not so visibly seen from the data analysis, is because the data used in analysis was 
average data from the whole month. The forecast errors are most likely affecting daily 
prices and seen as more or less random deviation from day-ahead price during a certain 
hour or hours. As the hours during which the deviations change from day-to-day the in-
formation might not reach the monthly averages. The fundamental findings of the article 
are considered to be valid for purposes of this thesis as neither the type of market nor the 
resolution is considered to dispute origin of liquidity in intraday – the forecast errors. The 
findings have been cited in other researches on the topic such as (Gürtler and Paulsen, 
2018), therefore are used in this thesis.  
 
The underlying assumption is that forecast errors bring liquidity to intraday market. How-
ever, it is difficult to state to which market the liquidity eventually goes to. Intraday auc-
tion is discrete auction, with no interconnectors, and thus the price of forecast error could 
be effectively priced in the auction. However, as the German intraday call auction occurs 
only 3 hours after the day-ahead auction, the forecast for the next day might yet be as 
accurate as needed to effectively trade the difference. There has been research conducted 
on this topic. Article by (Kath and Ziel, 2018) analyses the effect of forecasting on intra-
day call auction prices in German market. The article refers to publicly available fore-
casts, based on which the price forecasting models are created. The article cited three 
publicly available forecasts, TSOs load forecast provided at 10:00 d-1, the solar and wind 
power forecasts at 8:00 d-1 also provided by TSOs. The publicly available forecasts are 
often on hourly resolution and released only once per day. The article nevertheless con-
cedes, that market participants use commercial forecasts on 15-minute resolution, which 
presumably are more accurate than TSO forecasts. The article assumes (Kath and Ziel, 
2018, fig. 1), that updated renewables forecasts are used for intraday-call auction, from 
30-minutes before the auction occurs. There thus might be discrepancy between the fore-
casts for day-ahead and for intraday call auction. The latter forecast is presumed to be 
more accurate than forecast for day-ahead auction, as it has smaller granularity and is 
closer to the time of delivery. The difference between these two forecasts can be consid-
ered a forecast error of day-ahead forecast. The forecast error is then traded in intraday-
call auction on 15-minute resolution. If this holds true, there is also another component 
affecting intraday call auction prices besides the systematic need to balance. The forecast 
errors, at least to some extent, might be also traded in the same place; thus, this brings 
some variation to findings about intraday call auction prices. What is remarkable to note, 
that not all intraday auctions especially in future will be held three hours after day-ahead 
auction. If pan-European intraday auctions were to become true the auction timings would 
be 15.00 d-1, 22.00 d-1 and 12.00 D. For the gate closure of latest two auctions there is 
plenty of time for forecasts to update with more specific information and thus affect the 
trading behaviour of market participants. There have been studies done on the topic how 
does wind forecasting accuracy increase over time up to delivery hour. A study by (Holt-
tinen, 2005) measured absolute errors of wind power predictions over the one year period. 
The study was based on realized wind production data from Denmark in 2001. The study 
found out, that according forecasting model WPPT version 2, 90% of energy will be 
known 1 h before the delivery, 70 % of the energy will be known 9 h before, 60 % of 
energy will be known 24h before and only 50 % of the energy will be known 36 h before. 
Although the data is very old, and the wind farms have developed to probably more pre-
dictable way of operation as well as forecasting models and techniques have evolved over 
the time, it can be said that forecasts become more precise over the time closer to delivery. 
There is also other literature ending up with the same conclusion (Weber, 2010), (Zhang 
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Jie et al., 2015). It can thus be presumed that updated forecasts do affect the trading be-
haviour of market participants, which will become particularly evident when chronolog-
ically later auction will be introduced. More importantly the forecasting errors of renew-
able energy affect the system stability and need for balancing. As there is however no 
intraday auction held closer than 9 h for the first delivery hour at best and 33 h before the 
last delivery hour at worst, without any cross-border capacities, it is most probable that 
with such market design forecasting error liquidity is traded over continuous intraday 
market for most part. The article by (Kiesel and Paraschiv, 2017) has studied economet-
rics of continuous intraday 15-minute prices. It was clearly identified in the article that 
forecasts bring liquidity to 15-minute continuous trading. The factors affecting intraday 
liquidity will be investigated closer. 
 
5.5 Impact of continuous intraday market on system stability 
 It is important to bear in mind that basis for power system balance is aggregate balance 
of each BRP. The electricity market at the moment is built around day-ahead, as there is 
most liquidity in day-ahead market. The day-ahead market is held at time when knowing 
exact amount of power production during delivery hour is non-predictable. Thus, it can 
be thought that the higher the amount of renewables in power system, the more imbal-
ances for BRPs managing VRES portfolios during delivery hour thus the more balancing 
has to be done. According to this conventional wisdom, as renewables enter the power 
system in increasing amounts  the more balancing volume is required and thus higher the 
balancing costs (Batalla-Bejerano and Trujillo-Baute, 2016). Also, this is part of the cause 
of declining frequency quality in Nordic countries as mentioned earlier(Nordic TSOs, 
2016). As research article (Batalla-Bejerano and Trujillo-Baute, 2016) has found such 
impacts of renewable generation on Spanish electricity market, the German electricity 
market has been and exception (Hirth and Ziegenhagen, 2015). Empirical work by Hirth 
and Ziegenhagen has challenged such conventional wisdom, introducing descriptive sta-
tistic about German balancing market volumes decrease simultaneously with increase of 
share of VRES in power system. The phenomenon is commonly referred in literature as 
German Balancing Paradox. The article (Koch and Hirth, 2018) further investigates the 
phenomenon and comes to a conclusion that ultimately the German balancing paradox is 
caused by efficient electricity markets that enable market participants to trade themselves 
to balance.  
 
It was identified by the article that combined installed generation capacity of wind and 
solar power had grown from 54 GW to 99 GW during years 2011-2017. As the new in-
stalled capacity tends to have higher capacity factor, the increase in annual energy pro-
duction is even higher ranging from 69 TWh to 145 TWh for the respective time period. 
At the same time average FRR Capacity procured, both upward and downward reserve 
combined during years 2011-2014 has been 8.8 GW, which has dropped by 20% by the 
end of 2017 to average of 7.2 GW. The amount of activated reserves had declined even 
more, it dropped from well above 7 TWh in 2011 to 4 TWh in 2017, a 45 % of decline in 
balancing energy.    
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Figure 17: Average German system balance per quarter hour for 2012, 2014 and 2017 (Koch and 
Hirth, 2018) 
 
Figure 17 above shows the average system balance per hour for 2012, 2014 and 2017. 
The red line, which depicts average system balance per hour in 2012, has significant var-
iation especially in the morning. The system has been on average short of power by -800 
MW and long on power 800 MW during the same hour. An average 1600 MW swing 
during the same hour is terrific and requires a lot of attention from system balancing per-
spective. The blue and black line which represent system balance per hour in 2014 and 
2017 respectively have evened out the curves, and although there are systematic imbal-
ances, the swings are much lower. It can be found from the figure that need for balancing 
has clearly decreased over the years, as the curves have flattened over time. It can be 
expressed in other words, the burden of system balancing has shifted from balancing mar-
kets run by TSOs, to other instances. 
 
The other instances argued by the article are intraday markets provided by EPEX SPOT. 
EPEX SPOT launched quarter-hourly trading products on German intraday market in De-
cember 2011 and the quarter hourly intraday auctions in December 2014. After the 
launch, the liquidity on these markets has skyrocketed. Between years 2012 and 2017 the 
liquidity of quarter hourly contracts has increased from 1 TWh in 2012 to 10 TWh in 
2017. The article finds that grid imbalances have declined hand in hand with increase of 
trading on quarter hourly contracts. (Koch and Hirth, 2018) 
 
Let us further analyse the German market design. The day-ahead trading volume was 233 
TWh in Germany on EPEX SPOT market. The overwhelming amount of liquidity is on 
hourly resolution. The intraday liquidity in Germany was 47 TWh in 2017 of which 
around 10 TWh has been on 15-minute contracts. Therefore, the liquidity on continuous 
intraday hourly market in Germany is around 37 TWh. From these numbers there can be 
drawn a conclusion that both day-ahead and intraday markets, also on 15-minute resolu-
tion, have been very liquid. Let us consider closer the 15-minute liquidity. Out of 10 TWh 
of total quarter hourly intraday liquidity, around 50 % has been traded on intraday auction 
and around other 50 % has been traded in continuous market. (Epex Spot, 2018) 
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Now let us consider what is traded where. According to the article (Neuhoff et al., 2016) 
continuous intraday 15-minute market and 15-minute intraday call auction are not of sub-
stitutional nature to each other. In other words, one market doesn’t compete for liquidity 
with another market. The article believes that this is due to timings where liquidity dis-
tributes. Whereas continuous intraday auction is used to correct the unexpected events 
closer to the delivery hour the intraday auction is used to correct the known factors based 
on day-ahead auction information. In other words, intraday auction at 3 pm D-1 is used 
to smoothen day-ahead positions to match the 15-minute ISP requirement, using so called 
‘old information’. (Neuhoff et al., 2016)  This supports findings of this thesis in price 
analysis of intraday auction prices. When some new information enters the market, con-
tinuous intraday market is used to utilize this information. According to common sense, 
higher fluctuations such as large-scale forecast errors can be adjusted in hourly continu-
ous market whereas finer adjustments on quarterly basis can be done on 15-minute con-
tinuous market.   
 
It was found in the article (Koch and Hirth, 2018) that intraday auction helps balancing 
the power system. The article has identified the same variables as this research, namely 
wind production solar production and load fluctuations. The finding relates to the forecast 
errors addressed earlier in this thesis. Ultimately there are two kinds of errors, as men-
tioned previously, level error and phase error. It could be said that phase error is uncer-
tainty in timing and level error is uncertainty in gradient. Because, solar generation and 
load profile are systematic errors, frequently following diurnal pattern, i.e. solar genera-
tion increases in the morning and decreases in the evening – same goes for load. As one 
day ahead before the occurrence of such variables as solar and load is relatively accurately 
known, this eliminates the phase error. Therefore, as electricity is allocated in day-ahead, 
the systematic error is fixed in the auction on variables which are predictable. These sys-
tematic errors according to the article have declined by 80% after introduction of intraday 
auction (Koch and Hirth, 2018). There is still some uncertainty in level error, i.e. in the 
gradients of solar and especially load gradients, but those can later be addressed in con-
tinuous hourly intraday market. The article finds that it is difficult to predict wind power 
production at time of intraday auction, because the phase error still applies for win power, 
and makes prediction difficult at 3 pm D-1. As the wind power production is not so easy 
to predict in intraday auction, therefore the continuous intraday would be better place to 
manage the balancing for wind power producers. EPEX intraday market holds substantial 
amount of liquidity, both on hourly and 15-mintue contracts.  
 
The research by (Neuhoff et al., 2016) analyses the trading volumes in the last 3 hours 
before the delivery of continuous quarter hourly intraday market. The research finds that 
most traded volume is on the last hour before the delivery start. EPEX intraday continuous 
extends up to 5 minutes to the delivery hour, which gives wind power producers a sub-
stantial amount of time to fix the production plans in line with latest forecasts and trade 
themselves to balance. This is a very important finding, as it signifies that most trading is 
done on 15-minute products right before delivery on the delivery hour, thus directly com-
peting with balancing market. 
 
Considering these findings, there could be drawn a conclusion, that intraday volumes 
compete for balancing market volumes. That is the conclusion of research by Koch and 
Hirth as well. In other words, intraday auction is used to trade day-ahead positions on 
quarter hours, whereas continuous intraday both hourly and quarter hourly market fixes 
the forecasting errors which are not considered in intraday auction. Intraday auction and 
continuous intraday market do not compete for liquidity amongst each other, but together 
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compete for balancing and reserve market liquidity. Due to liquid intraday markets, li-
quidity has shifted from balancing markets to intraday markets and need for balancing 
has decreased. 
 
Considering the system imbalance curves from figure 16, it could be signified that liquid-
ity on 15-minute resolution contracts is quite purely dedicated for system balancing. This 
conclusion stems from vision that sum of individual BRP imbalances equal to system 
imbalance. The vision holds even more so true for German market, where passive bal-
ancing is forbidden by legislation. The German legislation forces BRPs to actively trade 
themselves to balance. The 15-minute trading thus addresses directly BRP imbalances, as 
most of the liquidity is on hourly contracts, and clearly seems to have impact on system 
imbalance as can be seen from figure 16. The significance of the findings is, that accord-
ing to article (Pape et al., 2016) balancing done by market participants is always cheaper 
than balancing done by the TSO. Therefore, every MWh traded in 15-minte resolution 
intraday market potentially brings savings to the system.  
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6 Quarter hourly resolution for Nordic power system  
6.1 Impacts on market 
There has been identified two impactful factors in German market design that are benefi-
cial for the power system. Those are intraday auctions that help power system get rid of 
systematic imbalances and other is sufficient liquidity on quarters close to delivery hour 
that help BRPs to reach final balance. Will purely implementing this market design bring 
the same benefit to Nordics? 
 
Presumably 15-minute ISP in the Nordics is expected to bring the same benefits as it has 
brought to the German market and power system. System will have less structural hourly 
imbalances, less imbalance jumps, system will be balanced by market not by TSOs. Given 
that consumption will be metered in the Nordics on 15-minute resolution, implies ever 
more reasons for demand to shift to quarter hourly resolution, thus to intraday. However, 
it is not so simple. There is one major difference between German market and Nordic 
market, the interconnectors.  The interconnectors play pivotal role in Nordic electricity 
market. The Nordic synchronous area is divided into 11 delivery areas, all connected with 
interconnectors. This is not the case for Germany, where everything happens within one 
market area. In addition, there are various HVDC interconnectors which connect Nordic 
synchronous area to other synchronous areas such as Baltic, Central European and soon 
to Great Britain as well. There is already up to 8 000 MW interconnector capacity stem-
ming from Nordic synchronous area, to somewhere else. This adds a great amount of 
complexity to the 15-minute ISP implementation in the Nordics, first and foremost, by 
restricting cross zonal gate closure time for one hour before the delivery. This already is 
a major setback, as most of 15-minute product liquidity is traded during the last hour 
before delivery, as previously discussed. Thus, the most pivotal trading for system bal-
ancing, from chronological point of view, the 15-minute products before delivery, is 
crossed out form Nordic power system.  
 
This thus implies, that the ACER methodology on cross zonal gate closure in intraday, 
which forces rolling cross zonal gate closure with respect to ISP will not give full benefit 
in Nordics. The issue in German continuous intraday market with gate closure is, that 
even though there are four 15-minute products during an hour, they all close at the same 
time. This creates an inefficiency, of uneven latency of available information for trading 
purposes. The information used for trading on 1st quarter of an hour is potentially one 
second old before delivery at the time of gate closure. The information used for trading 
on last quarter of an hour, is at minimum 45 minutes old or late. Thus, there is systemat-
ically more uncertainty when trading on last quarter compared to first quarter of an hour. 
Given that gate closure time will be rolling, the information available of each quarter is 
standardized, always potentially 1 second old. Even if there will not be cross border 15-
minute gate closure up to delivery in Germany, the inter zonal rolling gate closure will be 
of great benefit as well. In the Nordics however, rolling gate closure will standardize the 
information used as one-hour old information, as cross zonal gate closure must be at least 
one hour before delivery.   
 
There arises a concern, why should there be cross zonal gate closure one hour before the 
delivery in Nordics. The ACER decision on intraday cross-zonal gate opening and intra-
day cross-zonal gate closure times the intraday gate closure is to be set at most one hour 
before the start of the relevant market time unit. Thus, it can be closer to delivery, but at 
most one hour. In the explanatory document for the intraday cross-zonal gate opening and 
gate closure times the decision to keep 60 minutes is further explained (ENTSO-E, 2016). 
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It is said in the document that all TSOs have explored the time span needed for scheduling 
and balancing purposes and come up with 60 minutes of time needed. The reason thus 
lies, at least according to this input, that the 60 minutes is needed to have for balancing 
and scheduling purposes. It is argued in the document, that in the future the time can be 
shortened after harmonization of balancing mechanisms is implemented as foreseen in 
the EB GL. (ENTSO-E, 2016, chap. 4) Thus it can be deduced, that as cross-zonal gate 
closure in the Nordics is one hour prior to delivery, the Nordic TSOs truly need the hour 
of time for balancing and scheduling purposes. This could be related to estimating effects 
of interconnector flow to the power system, thus scheduling the balancing to counter im-
balance jumps for example. It is thus assumed in the thesis, that as long as interconnectors 
are on hourly resolution, no change to cross-zonal gate closure will occur. 
 
As the interconnectors close 60 minutes before delivery, there arises a question, does 
there have to be cross zonal market up delivery. Would it be possible to balance the sys-
tem with intraday market and still gain benefits from 15-minute trading without cross 
border trade even in the Nordics? In theory, there could be 11 local markets one per each 
delivery area in the Nordics with local gate closure up to delivery hour. In this manner 
market participants could trade within each delivery area and establish quarter hourly 
balance within the delivery area. Given that each delivery area would balance itself, the 
whole system would reach balance. This is not so straight forward, however. The problem 
lies in market structure of Nordic countries. There are statistics provided on intraday vol-
umes in Nordics per nature of trade by ACER in their market monitoring report from 
2017 (C. ACER, 2018, fig. 26).  According to the statistics, Finland has the highest intra-
zonal intraday liquidity of all Nordic countries, which is only 40%. For market areas in 
Sweden and Norway the intra zonal liquidity is below 10 %. This means, that most of all 
intraday trading in the Nordics is cross-zonal. Of all areas, in Nordics only Finland could 
effectively self-balance the market area without cross-zonal intraday market, and even so 
the market efficiency would be reduced greatly. In other words, in the Nordics market 
participants nearly always tend to trade between different price zones, not within one like 
in Germany for example. Therefore, even if continuous intraday gate closure would ex-
tend up to delivery within price zone, it would have little effect on efficient system bal-
ancing, as there would not be counterparty with whom efficient trading would occur. 
Thus, in order to gain same benefits from 15-minute ISP as in Germany, the cross-zonal 
gate closure should be introduced up to delivery, on the side to 15-minute contracts. 
 
6.2 Impacts on transmission system 
At the same time, the declining frequency quality in the Nordic synchronous area has 
been identified as a great concern amongst TSOs. The frequency quality in Nordic coun-
tries has been declining over the decade already as mentioned earlier, but TSOs predict 
that the trend will remain the same due to ongoing changes in the power system (Nordic 
TSOs, 2016). The large trends decreasing the frequency quality are ever increasing 
amount of intermittent generation, mainly wind power, Swedish nuclear phase-out and 
new interconnectors to Continental Europe up to year 2025 (Nordic TSOs, 2016).  
 
The article has identified challenges that make maintaining an adequate frequency diffi-
cult with regard to these high-level trends. These challenges include larger structural in-
tra-hour imbalances, changes around hourly shift and reduced access to reserves. The 
article acknowledges that trend towards increasing intra-hourly imbalances will grow in 
future, especially during morning and evening peaks when there are large shifts in con-
sumption, production and the HVDC links. The report has modelled imports and exports 
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of Nordics during average winter week of 2025. The model predicted that imports and 
exports of Nordics during average winter week in 2025 and there was found gross daily 
swings from exports to imports. It has been specifically identified in the report that large 
flow changes in HVDC links will cause significant balancing difficulties. Important fact 
to bear in mind is that Nordic synchronous area is relatively small compared to amount 
of interconnectors stemming from it. Therefore, collective cross-zonal interconnector 
ramping affects frequency of Nordic power system more than the one larger power sys-
tem. It can be thus said, that interconnectors pose a heavy challenge to maintain system 
balance, due to capability of faster ramping than rest of power system. However, it has 
also been acknowledged that efficient use of the HVDC interconnectors in the day-ahead 
and intra-day market requires faster changes in flow direction than are currently accepted, 
which will further increase intra-hour imbalances if mitigation measures are not intro-
duced. According to the article one of these mitigation measures could be further re-
striction of ramping limit on each HVDC interconnector. 
 
There are thus clearly two approaches to treat interconnectors in the Nordic electricity 
market. On one hand allowing fully market-based flow over interconnectors is the basis 
for electricity markets in Nordics, because there are eleven delivery areas within the Nor-
dics. On the other hand interconnectors play important role in system adequacy, such as 
frequency quality, which needs to be maintained on stable level. These two approaches 
somewhat contradict with each other. It could be argued, that if interconnectors would be 
on 15-minute resolution the difference between market-based flow and system balancing 
would be narrow, potentially one contribution for another. As Nordics are fragmented 
into eleven delivery areas, it could be said, that for Nordics to gain significant benefit 
from 15-minute ISP the interconnectors need to be addressed in quarter hourly resolution. 
Otherwise, most of the trading important for system balancing would occur within deliv-
ery area, which does not bring social welfare, which wholesale electricity markets are 
expected to bring.    
 
6.2.1 Ramping restriction 
The ramping limit currently in the Nordic region toward the continental Europe is 600 
MW/h. This limit stems from ramping speed, which is 30 MW/minute, where intercon-
nectors are ramped over 20 minutes, 10 minutes before the change of the hour and 10 
minutes after. Thus the 600 MW/h. (Nordic TSOs, 2018a) There is not any evidence that 
Nordic TSOs would tighten or loosen the ramping restriction. However, the future is chal-
lenging. Three new HVDC interconnectors are under construction and deployed in near 
future from Nordic synchronous area accounting for total of 3200 MW additional capacity 
by 2021. Coupled with increasing wind power production this will increase the balancing 
challenge to Nordic power system. Already today ramping limit restricts the market from 
perfect operation and thus costs in terms of social welfare. According to statistics from 
2016, on about 7 % of the hours in 2016 trading was restricted due to ramping restriction 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2017). In other words, trades that would have happened in per-
fect market could not happen due to ramping restriction, implying a cost in form of de-
creased social welfare. If ramping restriction would be tightened say to 400 MW/h, the 
market would be restricted even more. 
 
In the explanatory document to Nordic synchronous area proposal for ramping re-
strictions for active power output (Nordic TSOs, 2018b, chap. 5) is stated that with in-
creased amount of HVDC interconnectors, changed flow pattern and the introduction of 
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15-minute ISP requires that ramping limits, ramping periods and methodology for deter-
mining these limits need to be re-evaluated. It is also proposed in the proposal itself (Nor-
dic TSOs, 2018a, Article 4), that there will be a ramping restrictions on BRPs representing 
power generating modules in Finland, Norway and Sweden when their hourly production 
plans change more than 200 MW at hour shift. In that case BRPs would need to resched-
ule their production plan with quarterly steps 15 minutes before and after hourly shift to 
better match the consumption pattern. The detailed terms and conditions would be speci-
fied on national level. This however still needs to be assessed, as mentioned in explana-
tory document. Thus, it could be said, that one approach to solve the declining frequency 
problem is to limit market from free functioning and try to control the assets to some 
extent to match system needs better. 
  
On the contrary, it is envisioned that after implementation of 15-minute resolution, the 
ramping limit could be relaxed. This would be remarkable change for Nordic power sys-
tem. If cross-border flows would be allocated on quarter hourly resolution, then the inter-
connectors could be ramped 7.5 minutes before and after each quarter shift, effectively 
aggregating to continuous ramping over the whole hour. If the ramping speed would be 
considered the same, 30 MW/h, the continuous ramping approach would result in 1800 
MW/h ramping limit (Copenhagen Economics, 2017). 
 
Let us assume, that ramping speed in case of continuous ramping would decrease to 20 
MW/h to cause less stress on power system, thus resulting in 1200 MW/h hourly ramping 
limit. There are two separate effects of such change, first the quarter hourly imbalance 
jumps would be supposedly smaller than hourly imbalance jumps as former ones would 
correspond to grid changes real time. Therefore, less tuning of interconnectors would be 
needed by default. Second, the immediate ramping limit would be reduced to 300 
MW/quarter, whilst the hourly ramping limit would be increased to 1200 MW/h, given 
that ramping speed is 20 MW/h. The impact of such arrangement would mean less ramp-
ing speed, thus smaller stress on power system in form of immediate ramping limit (300 
MW vs. 600 MW) and longer ramp times while simultaneously increasing hourly ramp-
ing limit. Inevitably continuous ramping would relieve stress from power system balanc-
ing, in particular of imbalance jumps resulting by HVDC, thus increasing frequency qual-
ity. In order for continuous ramping to become reality the flow on interconnectors, espe-
cially HVDC interconnectors, should be allocated on 15-minute resolution. However, as 
flow for the first time on interconnector is determined in day-ahead market, which oper-
ates on hourly resolution, a contradiction arises. There is no way to make electricity flow 
on quarter hourly resolution over the interconnectors, unless day-ahead market switches 
to quarter hourly resolution. The report by (Copenhagen Economics, 2017) argues that if 
day-ahead flow would simply be divided by four on each quarter, intraday market could 
fix the flow on 15-minute resolution. For instance, day-ahead market has determined flow 
on two consequent hours in some direction. The flow is restricted to chosen direction by 
ramping limit. In the intraday market, the flow would be split on each quarter. Quarter 
hourly intraday market would give opportunity for market participants to start the ramp 
up earlier. Consequently, the relieved ramping limit would free capacity for intraday mar-
ket, which could potentially be used for trading.  
 
The report does not reveal which intraday market (auction vs. continuous) is thought of 
in their illustration, thus both options will be considered separately. In any case such ar-
rangement would lead to some form of inefficiency due to following reasons. First, the 
reference prices and clearing would have already been established with respect to ramping 
restriction, thus impacting social welfare. Second, and most importantly, the capacity 
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available for intraday market on the quarters is already restrained by the ramping limit 
after day-ahead auction. This already sets a pre-condition that no trading can be done 
during the hour, which is restricted by ramping limit in intraday, in example above the 
second hour in intraday market. In case of continuous intraday market, the quarter hourly 
trading could start the ramping on earlier quarters of the first hour. The ramping restriction 
could thus be relaxed at the hour shift. However, the flow still needs to respect the quarter 
hourly ramping limit which is 450 MW/quarter or 300 MW/quarter, depending by ramp-
ing speed, which is not considered in the report. Say continuous intraday would relax 
ramping limit so that theoretically the flows between two hours are no longer restricted 
by ramping limit. In order to benefit from ramping limit relaxation, trading should occur 
on second hour thus utilizing the freed capacity. This could be done in continuous intra-
day, on first come first serve principle, that capacity would free from 1st quarter of second 
hour as flow is increasing on 4th quarter of first hour. If so, the freed capacity would not 
be used optimally in auction clearing, thus not resulting in capacity pricing nor in social 
welfare optimized matching. Therefore, cross-zonal intraday auctions need to come to 
play. At the time of the auction, the capacities are halted, and flows are aggregated be-
tween day-ahead and continuous intraday. At this time, the day-ahead flows have been 
affected by continuous intraday trades, thus re-calculation of ramping limits is possible, 
thus freeing capacity from second hour and clearing market systematically with respect 
to freed capacity. The ramping limits could be re-calculated in first intraday auction right 
after day-ahead, however, little changes are anticipated as little new information has en-
tered the market. The possibility to change the ramping in first auction largely depends 
on allocation constraints of all hours combined, such as quarter hourly ramping limits, 
hourly ramping limits, capacities available, etc. Therefore, continuous intraday would be 
important market to relax the ramping limit.  
 
Based on discussion above it could be said, that quarter hourly intraday auction and quar-
ter hourly continuous intraday would bring benefit to power system in terms of ramping 
limit relaxation and system control, even though not as much as day-ahead market on 15-
minute resolution. It can be thus said, that 15-minute ISP itself is not enough to bring 
benefits to full extent. It is necessary to have 15-minute resolution markets to enable mar-
ket participants, the BRPs, to change their trading behaviour in correct direction from 
system perspective.  
 
6.3 Market coupling benefits 
Market coupling for the most part is based on price differential between areas, equating 
to optimized producer and consumer surplus thus resulting optimized interconnector 
flow. In order for interconnector flow to occur two things are needed, harmonized con-
tracts and interconnector capacity. Currently, contracts between Nordics and Central Eu-
rope are not harmonized. There are many interconnectors connecting two respective syn-
chronous areas, such as NorNed, Kontek and Baltic cable and more to come in near future. 
On one side of the cable, such as in Germany and Netherlands, settlement occurs on 15-
minute resolution, thus creating liquidity pool on quarter hourly resolution. On the other 
side of the cable, in the Nordics, all liquidity is on hourly contracts as there are no products 
on finer time resolutions. This leads to situation where products are not harmonized be-
tween different markets, leaving central European quarter hourly pool of liquidity com-
pletely inaccessible for any Nordic market participants. Merely a legislative change of 
ISP from one hour to 15-minutes will not change the status quo of separate orderbooks. 
It is however possible to trade on 15-minute contracts cross-border on panEuropean in-
traday platform XBID already today, for example between Germany and Austria. It is 
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thus presumable, that there indeed will be shared orderbook between Central Europe and 
Nordics after implementation of 15-minute ISP. The article (Copenhagen Economics, 
2017) had also found that harmonization of products would be one of potential benefits 
from 15-minute ISP. 
 
There is alternative approach to consider the market coupling benefits. The markets are 
already coupled between Nordics and Central Europe on hourly resolution. First, in day-
ahead, second in continuous intraday on hourly resolution. The day-ahead market and 
continuous hourly intraday market hold the most liquidity already, so it could be said that 
most of market coupling benefits are already achieved. As most of the continuous trading 
occurs close to delivery hour, in order to get any benefit from harmonized products, there 
should be capacity between Nordics and Central Europe up to delivery hour. However, 
this is already an issue for hourly continuous intraday, as there might not be capacity left 
after day-ahead for those interconnectors. Thus, the bottleneck for liquidity sharing is not 
the unharmonized contracts rather it is the interconnector capacity. If there is not capacity 
after day-ahead, the intraday coupling will bring no benefit. 
 
This is not so straight forward, however. It has become evident from articles referred in 
this thesis, that the more renewables there are in the power system, the more valuable the 
latest information to the market is. There is a reason for most of 15-minute trading occur-
ring within an hour to delivery, as the latest information can be utilized most efficiently. 
It is not for granted, that the flow which has been established in day-ahead, would remain 
the same in intraday, on quarter hourly resolution up to delivery. If there is a change in 
wind power forecasts for example, which occurs relatively close to delivery, it might af-
fect short term trading behaviour of market participant and create a financial incentive 
which would turn the flow around on interconnector. If there is large changes in wind 
power forecasts, the situation described could happen already in continuous hourly intra-
day market, thus quarter hourly resolution would not bringing much added value in terms 
of liquidity. However, as there is 15-minute ISP in Germany and Netherlands already, the 
forecast changes affect the quarter hourly position in the first place. It could be thought, 
that if forecast error occurs, which leads to reverse flow on interconnector due to trading 
on hourly resolution, the trading for balancing will inevitably occur on 15-minute resolu-
tion as well. Therefore, harmonizing contracts will provide an opportunity for market 
participants from both synchronous areas for optimal balancing, at least in one direction 
of interconnector, maybe in both. Trading for balancing however, just like research has 
shown, will occur as close to delivery hour as possible where latest information is in use 
to fix the final position. We can thus come back to conclusion where most of 15-minute 
continuous intraday benefits occur close to delivery hour. At this point the benefits of 
short-term 15-minute trading face the same problem as rolling gate closure, the closure 
of interconnectors one hour before delivery. In other words it is impossible to trade on 
15-minute resolution close to delivery over interconnectors, because cross-border gate 
has closed. This is not necessarily the case for balancing market.  
 
6.3.1 Balancing market integration 
At the time thesis was written, the balancing market gate-closure is 45 minutes before the 
delivery, on hourly resolution. The same time when production plans need to be submitted 
to TSOs. It is discussed in the chapter 3, that the time of gate closure of balancing market 
will supposedly shorten to 25 minutes before delivery hour. It envisioned that at the time 
of 15-minute ISP, the balancing market will also move to 15-minute resolution. Even with 
these changes, the uncertainty of balancing providers is higher than in intraday given the 
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rolling gate closure. Even at the time the thesis was written, in German intraday market 
it is possible to trade on 15-minute resolution up to delivery hour, on all four quarters. 
The issue is that it is not possible to trade with latest information on every quarter just 
like discussed in chapter 7.2. However, if there will be rolling gate closure implemented 
up to delivery in German intraday market for example, 15-minute products would close 
right at the start of delivery of the product, making latest information possible to utilize. 
This sort of arrangement is very competitive against balancing market, even with gate 
closure up to 25 minutes before the hour. Even if balancing market would have 25-minute 
rolling gate closure with respect to every quarter, continuous intraday would still be more 
accurate. Why is balancing market of such importance then?   
 
The two biggest differences between balancing and intraday market is that balancing 
products have obligation to delivery and the products are standardized. Depending on 
reserve type aFRR or mFRR there are standardized full activation times and balancing 
products are often bound to a location. The biggest difference between aFRR and mFRR, 
is that aFRR reserve is activated automatically without any human intervention (Fingrid 
Oyj, 2019b). On the contrary the mFRR order needs to physically be accepted by the 
TSO. As the aFRR reserve reacts to frequency deviations, it cannot be substituted by 
orders from intraday market, because the products differ fundamentally by the nature of 
execution. The mFRR nevertheless is subjected to substitution by intraday trading, just 
like the research by (Koch and Hirth, 2018) suggests. It is not so straight forward, how-
ever. The obligation of delivery largely separates these two markets. When a trade in 
intraday occurs, the trade affects portfolios of both market participants. Both market par-
ticipants are responsible for conducted trade, one’s portfolio has gained energy, the other 
one’s has lost it. But there is no legal responsibility for market participant to affect the 
physical production/consumption as a result of the trade. This could be named as portfolio 
trading, whereas mFRR market is asset trading. When TSO accepts order from balancing 
market, the market participant which’ order is accepted, is obliged to deliver the electric-
ity, and the delivered amount is physically measured by TSO. In balancing market, there 
is no counterparty, when TSO accepts an upregulation order, the market participant needs 
to produce the amount, but no-one is obliged to consume it. Therefore, it could be said, 
that mFRR is used to control or at least affect the frequency in the grid. Moreover, the 
mFRR asset’s location is known, which is important information when balancing the 
whole synchronous area. 
 
This leads the discussion back to interconnectors. The market flow can be whichever di-
rection on interconnector up to maximum capacity. The interconnectors close one hour 
before delivery, thus the full gain of 15-minute trading cannot be utilized. However, it is 
never known, whether there will be up-regulation or down-regulation need and on which 
side of the interconnector. It was earlier identified that ramping constraint and fully uti-
lized capacity in day-ahead restrain intraday trading, especially close to delivery if the so-
called left-over capacity is utilized. However, it does not necessarily restrain TSOs to 
balance the power system using the HVDC interconnector. The focal point is, that order 
book exists on other side of interconnector in intraday market therefore, why not to utilize 
them for balancing purposes. Given that the order book is with rolling gate closure with 
respect to 15-minute product, it gives a large potential for TSOs to balance the power 
system real time for cost of intraday electricity, which is a priori cheaper than balancing 
electricity.  
 
For example, on 31st of January 2019 at 12.00-15.00 up regulation price in SE4 was 
267€/MWh. The intraday market price during these four hours was somewhere between 
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40 and 70 €/MWh, both on hourly and quarter hourly resolution (Epex Spot, 2019b, sec. 
EPEXSPOTINTRADAY CONTINUOUS). The total scheduled flow on interconnector 
from SE4 to DE was 521 MW, 468 MW, 433 MW and 368 MW during respective hours. 
(Nord Pool Group, 2019, sec. Regulating prices, Total scheduled flow, Nord Pool Intra-
day) Given that capacity on the cable is 615 MW, there was capacity on every hour. In-
stead of using local resources for balancing for up-regulation price, it is possible for TSO 
to accept an intraday order from Germany for significantly cheaper price and subtract the 
amount from interconnector flow.  
 
Now there arises a question, why wouldn’t this be possible already today, in hourly res-
olution. The problem with such arrangement in hourly resolution is largely related to in-
tra-hourly imbalances. If Nordic TSO activates hourly intraday order from Germany, 
there is no guarantee about precise timing when market participant will deliver electricity. 
At worst, the gain of balance SE4 area gains as result of the trade may be loss of balance 
in Germany. When trading will go to smaller granularity, coupled with German legisla-
tion that obliges market participants to trade themselves to balance, there is supposedly 
higher chance that the electricity will be physically delivered during the quarter. This 
could be expected more so, if German intraday market would have rolling gate closure. 
In such case, there could be raised concern, whether the actions of Nordic TSO would 
affect German power system balance. However, if Nordic TSO matches order from Ger-
man intraday market, in theory the German power system balance would be in status quo, 
as some of German market participants is obliged to delivery energy that is subtracted 
from interconnector flow. In turn, if Swedish intraday market would have cheaper intra-
day electricity than German balancing market, German TSO could perform same set of 
balancing. What makes balancing over interconnectors particularly interesting case, is 
that it suffices the criterion of mFRR balancing. The activation time criterion is fulfilled, 
as the interconnector can be physically tuned, with ramping speed often exceeding the 
one of conventional generation. Also, the location of interconnector is known, thus the 
location criterion for analysing intra-zonal bottlenecks is also known.  
 
In theory, TSOs could net imbalances via interconnectors already today. If delivery areas 
on different sides of interconnector need balancing in opposite direction, for instance up-
regulation in Sweden and down regulation in Germany, it could already today be netted 
in interconnector flow.  The difference is, that today it is not known what is going to 
happen during delivery hour, will the system be short or long on power, as that is largely 
determined by structural imbalances within an hour. Thus, if TSOs come to an agreement 
to imbalance net the flow over interconnector, for the beginning of the hour based on 
current information, the information might be old in the end of the hour, and the flow 
would not contribute as much to system balance. The fundamental change that 15-minute 
ISP coupled with rolling gate closure brings, is that there will not be any delivery hour 
after the change. To make possible avoiding balancing activation in balancing market by 
activating orders from intraday market both sides markets around interconnector need to 
standardized products. As there is no 15-minute ISP in Sweden, thus no 15-minute intra-
day market, this is not possible during the time the thesis was written. Therefore, imple-
menting 15-minute products in intraday in Nordics, will potentially bring market coupling 
benefits not only in intraday, but in system balancing as well.   
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7 Conclusion 
 
The thesis analysed impact of 15-minute imbalance settlement period to Nordic electricity 
market. It was identified in the thesis, that there are many inefficiencies hourly imbalance 
settlement period causes to the power system. The most influential inefficiencies were 
systematic imbalances due to imbalance jumps both within areas and over interconnectors 
as well as possibility of netting imbalances over an hour. All these combined have already 
caused a declining frequency quality in Nordic power system and is expected to do so in 
future as well. 
 
It is identified in the thesis, that there are other regulatory changes that will enforce as 15-
minute imbalance settlement period will be introduced. All these changes combined will 
greatly influence the Nordic market model. Generally, cost of imbalance will be higher 
with less opportunities to net the imbalances. This is expected to bring liquidity to intra-
day markets in purpose to find marketplace for balancing for BRPs. In order to assess the 
impact of 15-minute imbalance settlement period, the econometrics of German intraday 
call auction are analysed. The analysis was concluded to find impact of 15-minute imbal-
ance settlement period on market participants’ bidding behaviour. The hypothesis was, 
that intraday auction prices should have even some indication of structured prices, be-
cause market participants are forced to buy and sell electricity within the same hour. Three 
main findings were found out form the analysis:  
1. Intraday auction’s quarter hourly prices are very structured and systematic, re-
volving around day-ahead prices on hourly resolution. The auction price volatility 
is influenced by day-ahead price pattern revealing:   
2. Intraday auction is complimentary to day-ahead auction, where little new infor-
mation is traded, rather day-ahead positions are fixed to correspond 15-minute 
imbalance settlement period. This leads to situation that: 
3. Ultimately intraday auction does not price energy, rather it prices the pricing error 
of day-ahead auction, resulting in a systematic price formation of intraday auction.  
 
Findings supported the hypothesis. Based on other literature it was found, that quarter 
hourly intraday auction and continuous market combined, have helped German power 
system to reduce greatly structural system imbalances. The pre-condition for this is suf-
ficient liquidity in intraday market both on hourly and quarter-hourly contracts. Also, 
important factor identified is gate closure extending up to delivery, which reduces latency 
of information available, thus the uncertainty of market participants. Based on these ob-
servations, a conclusion can be drawn, that wholesale electricity market design affects 
power system stability and need for balancing. 
 
The answer to first research questions is that after introduction of 15-minute ISP, the 
market participants will actively seek themselves to balances on 15-minute contracts and 
closer to delivery to avoid imbalance fees. This is expected to bring liquidity to intraday 
markets, and greatly increase interest to quarter hourly contracts and auctions, which are 
yet inexistent in Nordic market model. With respect to principle of market model serving 
needs of market participant convenient wholesale electricity markets need to be estab-
lished, with 15-minute products, preferably both intraday auctions and continuous intra-
day market. 
 
It is identified in the thesis, that as whole German market is only one delivery area, the 
concept of system balancing by efficient functioning of intraday markets cannot be trans-
ferred to Nordics in full extent. This is because Nordic power system is divided into 
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eleven delivery areas, where electricity is mostly traded cross-zonal between different 
delivery areas. Therefore, if interconnector gate closure remains one hour before delivery, 
the full benefits of 15-minute ISP is difficult to achieve, as there will not be opportunity 
for Market participants to balance their positions as close to real time as possible. Alt-
hough trading on fine resolution can occur earlier, there is long time of uncertainty for 
market participant between the cross-zonal gate closure and quarter of delivery.  
 
To address the second research question, the 15-minute auction trading is believed to 
reduce amount of structural imbalances resulting mainly from demand but also from solar 
power production in Nordic power system. The availability of consumption meter data 
on 15-minute resolution in Nordics greatly supports the likelihood of this finding. In order 
to reduce the amount of stochastic imbalances resulting from wind power production in 
the system a continuous intraday market is needed with fine resolution and with gate 
closure close to delivery. Thus, the responsibility of system balancing is expected to shift 
towards market participants, and the more open intraday markets are, the better balancing 
can be done by market participants.   
 
To address the third research question, depending on market design and market coupling 
of Nordics to other markets, the 15-minute ISP can potentially open possibility to trade 
in finer resolution over HVDC interconnectors. The introduction of 15-minute products 
over HVDC interconnectors might not bring large market coupling benefits, but they may 
potentially overrule the current ramping restriction around the hour shift. In such case, 
the interconnector flows will be ramped over the whole hour, with a smaller ramp rate. 
This will greatly reduce the imbalance jumps over the HVDC interconnectors, and cou-
pled with systematic imbalance trading in intraday auctions, will greatly reduce need for 
balancing around hourly shift and the frequency quality in Nordic power system may be 
improved. 
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